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We examine the determinants of private equity returns using a newly constructed database of 7,500 
investments worldwide over forty years. The median investment IRR (PME) is 21% (1.3), gross of 
fees. One in ten investments goes bankrupt, whereas one in four has an IRR above 50%. Only one in 
eight investments is held for less than 2 years, but such investments have the highest returns. The 
scale of private equity firms is a significant driver of returns:  investments held at times of a high 
number of simultaneous investments underperform substantially. The median IRR is 36% in the 
lowest scale decile and 16% in the highest. Results survive robustness tests. Diseconomies of scale 
are linked to firm structure: independent firms, less hierarchical firms, and those with managers of 
similar professional backgrounds exhibit smaller diseconomies of scale.  
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Private equity (PE) became a global phenomenon in the past decade as it injected liquidity and fueled 
the M&A wave in the US and Europe.1 Strömberg (2007) estimates that by 2007 PE firms worldwide 
had acquired almost 14,000 companies worth nearly $3.6 trillion. Although recent papers have begun 
to analyze investor returns in PE (Kaplan and Schoar 2005; Ljungqvist, Richardson, and Wolfenzon 
2007), there is still little evidence on the cross-section of the performance of individual PE 
investments and, more importantly, on the drivers of this performance.  
For this reason, we have put together the largest and hitherto most up-to-date dataset on PE 
investment performance and characteristics. Our data comes from fund-raising private placement 
memorandums (PPMs) collected over the past eight years from investors on all continents. After 
applying a number of filters, our final sample contains 7,453 investments made in eighty-one 
countries by 254 PE firms between 1971 and 2005. This data allows us to derive statistics that 
contribute to several debates in private equity and to document the main drivers of the cross-section 
of returns. Prompted by the large increase in the size of PE funds, we pay special attention to the 
impact of scale on returns and provide evidence of the potential mechanisms of this relationship. 
The first contribution of our paper is to provide new descriptive statistics and stylized facts 
on the distribution of performance, duration, and size of PE investments around the world. We find a 
dramatic dispersion of returns: investments at the seventy-fifth percentile have an IRR of 50%, 
whereas those in the tenth percentile earn nothing. Most investments in our dataset, as in the samples 
of Kaplan (1991) and Strömberg (2007), are relatively long-lived. The median duration of the 
investments is nearly four years. But these long-lived investments are not those that deliver high 
returns. Indeed, we document a strong negative association between performance and duration. 
Quick flips (investments held less than two years), accounting for 12% of all PE investments, have 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the term private equity to refer to buyout investments. We do not include venture capital, real 
estate, or any other asset class that is sometimes also referred to as private equity. 
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median IRR (PME) of 85% (1.94),2 whereas investments held more than six years, which account for 
nearly 18% of all PE investments, have a median IRR (PME) of only 8% (0.79). 
Our statistics uncover additional stylized facts for investments across countries. We are the 
first to document substantial underperformance of investments in emerging countries, which may be 
of interest given their recent spectacular growth. The data also allows us to show for the first time 
that most PE investments around the world are small equity-wise. The median equity investment is a 
mere $10 million. The large deals trumpeted in the press are by far the exception. 
A second contribution of our paper is to identify empirically the drivers behind the great 
variation in the performance of PE investments. Because data availability is limited, the literature has 
focused on analyzing aggregate performance over time (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 2009) or across 
funds (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar 2005). Our investment-level data allows us to document the 
performance impact of several investment and PE firm characteristics. We find that small 
investments outperform large ones. In addition, and contrary to some arguments by fund managers, 
our results show a close connection between public and private equity: the average stock-market 
return over the life of an investment has a significant impact on IRR.  
Our most important finding, however, is that PE firm scale is a significant and consistent 
driver of returns. Casual evidence suggests that the scale of PE firms is an important concern of 
investors. Lerner et al. (2003, p.44) argue that “the unprecedented growth of the private equity 
industry appeared to have changed the industry in some permanent ways. First was the scale at which 
private equity groups operated. These concerns were particularly acute on the buyout side, where 
multi-billion-dollar funds have become the norm.” Along similar lines, Swensen et al. (1999, p.5) 
report that “many LBO firms appear to have explicitly lowered their return hurdles […], pricing 
deals to yield returns in the mid-to-high teens.” Indeed, the current scale of several PE firms 
                                                 
2 As in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), the public market equivalent (PME), is calculated as the present value of the dividends 
over the present value of the investments. A PME greater than one is equivalent to outperformance of the CRSP value-
weighted US stock index. 
 
 
3
contrasts sharply with that of PE firms twenty years ago. When comparing the sixteen professionals 
at KKR and the 470 at RJR Nabisco’s headquarters, Jensen (1989) implied that PE firms were 
positioned to generate superior performance partly because they were lean and focused 
organizations. Today, the industry has concentrated (Cornelius et al. 2007) and PE firms sometimes 
have hundreds of professionals of varied backgrounds doing a large number of deals around the 
world. Blackstone, a prominent PE firm, describes itself as “a firm of 1,300 professionals in fifteen 
offices worldwide. But we are more than that, our portfolio companies employ nearly one million 
people around the world making us a major factor in economies around the world. If our portfolio 
holdings and transactions were combined into a single company, [we] would rank as the equivalent 
of number thirteen in the Fortune 500.”3 A similar calculation would place KKR fifth in the Fortune 
500 ranking, just ahead of General Electric. This change in the industry raises the question: can large 
PE firms deliver sufficient returns? 
There is a large body of theoretical literature on the connection between firm size and 
performance. Williamson (1975) was among the first to point to “organizational diseconomies” as a 
potential mechanism of diseconomies of scale. Holmström and Roberts (1998) argued that, among 
other things, problems transferring knowledge may influence scale diseconomies. Models such as 
those of Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Garicano (2000), Stein (2002), and Vayanos (2003) have 
provided additional insight into the importance of knowledge transfer and communication costs to 
diseconomies of scale. According to Garicano (2000, abstract), “the key trade-off an organization 
confronts occurs between communication and knowledge costs.” He argues that as a firm scales up it 
benefits from an increased uptake of knowledge but is penalized by greater communication needs. 
Stein (2002) adds that the organizational diseconomies arising from coordination and communication 
costs in large firms may be more acute when the information that circulates is of a softer nature 
(trustworthiness of a borrower, company strategy, and so on).  
                                                 
3 http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/bxcom/hs/the_firm.htm 
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Although diseconomies of scale may be important for industrial firms, they may not lead to 
differences in returns across financial intermediaries if agents are rational and the market for capital 
is competitive and without significant frictions. Berk and Green (2004) conjecture that there should 
be no differences in the performance of large mutual funds and that of small mutual funds because 
their market for capital is highly competitive. But the provision of capital for PE firms involves more 
frictions than the provision of capital for mutual funds. Investors can add capital to a PE firm only 
every two to four years, when it raises new funds, and arbitrage is significantly more limited (no 
short selling, capital is locked-in). In addition, the kind of investment information that is transferred 
in a PE firm is of a softer nature than the stock-trading strategies in mutual funds, making 
communication costs greater in PE. All of these arguments suggest that diseconomies of scale could 
be great and highly visible in PE. 
In view of these theoretical arguments, communication costs should be a key determinant of 
performance. Since we have data for individual investments, we can create a proxy for the amount of 
communication of soft information in the firm over the life of each investment. Specifically, we 
measure firm scale for each investment as the average number of simultaneously held investments 
managed by the firm over the investment’s life. We believe this is a good measure because it 
captures two key features connecting scale and returns in PE. First, PE firms are supposed to provide 
significant and continuous attention to each of the companies in their portfolio. In addition, each 
investment, regardless of its size, probably requires a similar amount of time and communication 
(Quindlen, 2000). So, the number of investments under management is a good proxy for firm scale. 
Second, the monitoring phase of the investment is the period during which the information that 
circulates is softer. The amount of communication of soft information may thus best be captured by 
looking at the average scale of the firm over the life of the investment rather than at a specific point 
such as the time of entering or exiting the investment. 
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Our empirical estimates show that firm scale is a robust and consistent driver of the cross-
section of returns of PE investments. Investments held at times of a high number of “simultaneous 
investments” (SI) underperform substantially. The economic magnitude of the scale effect is large: a 
one-standard-deviation increase in SI decreases IRR by 9%. Investments in the lowest SI decile earn 
a median IRR (PME) of 36% (1.65), whereas those in the highest SI decile earn a median IRR 
(PME) of 16% (1.08). These results hold in a regression setting controlling for other factors that 
could be associated with performance, including several investment characteristics, PE firm 
characteristics, and fixed effects (country, industry, and time). 
A series of tests corroborates the robustness of the negative scale effect. Diseconomies of 
scale are present across subsamples, they survive the use of alternative econometric methods, and 
they are not the result of a simple mechanical effect resulting from firms exiting best-performing 
investments faster. We also show that survivorship bias, differences in risk, and reverse causality are 
unlikely to explain our findings. Finally, the scale effect is robust to the inclusion of fund and firm 
fixed effects and it is still present when we aggregate investments by fund and by firm.  
The third and final contribution of the paper is to test additional predictions of diseconomies 
of scale models and to provide evidence of the potential mechanisms explaining the negative scale 
effect. Although we believe that our measure of scale comes closest to key theoretical concepts 
connecting scale and returns, our data also allows us to create alternative proxies for both the 
activities of the PE firm and the type of investment information that travels within the PE firm. We 
find that the number of simultaneous investments over the life of the deal is a better predictor of 
negative returns than are other proxies. Finally, in the last section of the paper we collect additional 
data from PE directories, PE firm websites, managers’ biographies and the PPMs to develop proxies 
for the organizational structure of PE firms. These measures provide empirical support for Stein’s 
(2002) idea that hierarchical firms and organizations in which information flow is more difficult face 
higher marginal communication costs and thus display greater diseconomies of scale. Our data shows 
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that independent PE firms, those with flatter decision structures, and those with professionals of 
similar backgrounds exhibit less pronounced scale diseconomies.  
Our paper is also connected to two strands of the finance literature. First, it builds on the 
recent work exploring the relationship between performance and size in mutual funds (Chen et al. 
2004; Pollet and Wilson 2008) and in hedge funds (Fung et al. 2008; Teo 2009). Second, it 
complements the results of papers looking into venture capital, an asset class similar to PE. We 
provide empirical evidence consistent with that of the papers analyzing the trade-off between 
larger/smaller portfolios and diversified/concentrated portfolios (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 2003; 
Bernile et al. 2007; Cumming 2006; Fulghieri and Sevilir 2008; Cumming and Dai 2010;Gompers et 
al. 2008; Hochberg and Westerfield 2009) and we find results consistent with those in Bottazzi, Da 
Rin, and Hellmann (2008), who show that greater management involvement is associated with 
greater success in venture capital.4 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section II describes the data and 
provides the key performance and other descriptive statistics of PE investments. Section III deals 
with the drivers of performance and establishes the connection between returns and scale measured 
by the average number of simultaneous investments over the life of each investment. Section IV 
contains a series of robustness tests such as alternative performance measures, different subsamples, 
survivorship bias, reverse causality, and firm- and fund-level results. Section V is devoted to 
developing alternative proxies for firm scale, and disentangling potential sources of diseconomies of 
scale. Finally, section VI concludes by positing several supply and demand arguments that help 
account for the survival of the observed diseconomies of scale. 
 
                                                 
4 Our paper is also related to the literature on conglomerates. Lang and Stulz (1994) found that diversified firms trade at a 
discount, which is consistent with our results on diseconomies of scope presented in section V. But this evidence has 
been challenged recently by a series of papers arguing that the data on conglomerates is too noisy to establish such a 
connection (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf 2002; Campa and Kedia 2002; Schoar 2002; Villalonga 2004). Our paper may 
contribute to this debate because our data is less likely to suffer from the contamination of internal capital reallocation 
across the segments of a conglomerate (Maksimovic and Phillips 2002). 
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II. Private Equity Investments: Data and Stylized Facts 
II.A. The Sample 
In this paper, we put together the most comprehensive database of the individual investments 
made by private equity (PE) firms. Our data improves on other academic data-collection efforts in 
several ways. First, we go beyond fund-level performance (Kaplan and Schoar 2005) and provide 
results for individual investments; we also include a wealth of control variables. Second, unlike other 
investment-level datasets, such as the CEPRES data (Cumming and Walz 2010) or the data in 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007), our dataset contains the full track record of each PE firm, allowing us to 
compute the number of simultaneous investments a firm is holding at any point in time. This is 
essential to calculate a good measure of firm scale. Third, unlike these other databases, ours is more 
likely to represent the universe of PE investments because it comes from different investors and it 
includes PE firms these investors chose not to invest in. Finally, our dataset is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the largest panel of worldwide PE investment performance. 
Table I details the construction of our sample. The data was assembled by the authors by 
collecting fund-raising prospectuses, usually referred to as private placement memorandums (PPMs). 
PPMs contain the performance and characteristics of all prior investments made by the firm.5 We 
began in 2001 and stopped in 2007. We collected a total of 523 “unique” PPMs from both US and 
European investors.6 Since the focus of our paper is on the PE industry, we asked investors to 
provide us with PPMs aimed at raising PE funds. Some, however, gave us PPMs to raise venture 
capital funds (104 cases) and other alternative investment funds such as timber, infrastructure, land, 
real estate, or mezzanine (twenty-nine cases). We exclude these PPMs from our sample. We also 
                                                 
5 Private equity firms are organizations that manage private equity funds. A firm may have several funds running at each 
point in time. Funds have a finite life lasting ten to fourteen years. The typical firm launches a new fund every two to 
four years. When a firm raises a new fund, it gives a fund-raising prospectus to potential investors. Investors commit 
capital at fund inception and cannot add or withdraw capital during the fund’s life. Several investors gave us access to 
their prospectuses, but under signed confidentiality agreements, which bar us from disclosing information about the 
identity of the PE firms and their investments. 
6 On some occasions, we received the same PPM from different investors. We disregard such duplicate PPM. Sometimes, 
we received more than one PPM of the same PE firm at different points in time (e.g., one PPM for its 2003 fund and 
another for its 2006 fund). In these cases, we keep the more recent PPM. 
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exclude seventy-three PPMs without a track record—these are all first-time funds. These exclusions 
leave us with a sample of 317 PPMs. As panel B shows, 301 PPMs contain the track record of only 
one firm. In a few cases, however, the PPMs also contains the track records of PE firms for which 
some of the partners had previously worked. For this reason, our sample contains the track records of 
334 different PE firms with a total of 11,704 individual investments. 
< Table I > 
Table II compares our sample with the two most comprehensive publicly available PE 
datasets: Capital IQ (used by Bernstein et al. 2010), and Thomson Reuters (used extensively in the 
literature). Although these commercial databases keep track of the industry, country, and initiation 
date of the investments, they do not contain performance information, which is available for our 
sample.  
To compare coverage across databases, we applied filters excluding certain observations.7 
After the filtering is done, the number of observations in our comparable sample represents 83% of 
the number of investments in Capital IQ and 96% of those in Thomson. Our coverage is much better 
before 2000 (we have 20% to 30% more investments than the commercial databases) than it is in 
more recent years (we have 40% to 50% fewer investments). Our database is less US-focused (it 
covers 74% of the US investments covered by the commercial databases) but has greater coverage of 
the rest of the world. Our particularly high coverage of the early years should alleviate concerns of 
survivorship bias, while the good geographic coverage reduces the potential risk of a sample bias.  
< Table II > 
Since our data is based on PPMs, it differs from earlier commercial and academic datasets in 
that it contains information about the returns of individual investments. Although not all PPM come 
                                                 
7 For the comparison with Capital IQ (panel A), we need to exclude from our sample all non-buyout investments made by 
buyout funds. We also remove all loans, public equity, and venture capital investments. Additionally, we remove 
investments made after 2005 because we do not include them in our analysis as the performance of investments made 
within a few months before the end of our sampling period are not be reliable (see below). Finally, as in Bernstein et al. 
(2010), we include only investments made after 1986 and from OECD countries. For the comparison with the Thomson 
dataset, we apply the same filters as in panel A but we keep the pre-1986 investments and the non-OECD countries. 
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in the same format, most provide the same information. There are twelve pieces of useful 
investment-level data usually found in PPMs: (1) month and year of the initiation of the investment; 
(2) month and year of exit (date realized); (3) industry of the investment; (4) country where the 
investment is located; (5) value of equity invested (referred to as investment size below and often 
labeled as cost in PPMs); (6) total amount distributed (realized value); (7) current valuation of any 
unsold stake (unrealized value); (8) total value (the sum of (6) and (7)); (9) multiple (total value 
divided by investment size); (10) IRR; and (12) exit route (trade sale, IPO, and so on). Appendix 
table A.1 provides detailed definitions of all variables, and table A.2 reproduces a sample of a typical 
PE firm track record found in a PPM.  
To carry out the analysis below, we need to eliminate several observations from the original 
11,704 investments. Table III details the process of our sample construction. There are five different 
reasons for excluding observations from our initial sample. The specific filters used are listed in the 
first column of table III, whereas the second and third columns of the table show the number of PE 
firms and investments that remain in the sample after we impose each restriction.  
We start at the top of the table with the 11,704 investments in our database. First, we remove 
the 210 debt and public equity investments because they are unlikely to receive the same kind of 
monitoring as buyout or venture capital investments do. We then exclude investments for which we 
could not find key pieces of information.8 These exclusions are: (1) 261 investments for which we 
cannot compute the public market equivalent (PME) a performance measure because the date of 
investment initiation or the multiple is missing; (2) the 132 investments of one firm that does not 
report investment size; and (c) 628 investments whose industry could not be identified.9 Since part of 
the focus of our paper is on the scale of PE firms, we must also exclude the 288 investments of 
thirteen firms with selected track records. These firms indicated that they were including only the 
                                                 
8 Although PPMs provide most of this information for each investment, sometimes a few items are missing. We search 
for the missing information on the website of the PE firm that carried out the transaction, as well as in Thomson and 
Capital IQ. The distribution of the sources of information for these variables is provided in appendix table A.1. 
9 We need the industry of the investment because it is a proxy for risk, and we use it to measure firm scope in section V. 
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performance history of current management, or of particular sectors or countries in which the fund 
intended to invest.10 We also exclude 1,064 investments of forty-nine firms because they correspond 
to the managers’ personal track records before they joined the fund-raising firm and we cannot be 
certain that the investments reported in this form represent the full track record of the firm where 
they worked before.11 Finally, we exclude all investments made two years or less before the date of 
the PPMs. Nearly 45% of these investments are reported as “held at cost” with an IRR of zero, which 
is unlikely to be their true performance.12 After all of these restrictions, our final sample contains 
7,453 investments with minimal sample bias and all necessary information to carry out the analysis.  
The last four columns of the table calculate four different return measures for the remaining 
observations in the sample at each step; these measures help us assess if the exclusions affect the 
sample characteristics. The four measures are the median of: (1) IRR, which is the measure of rate of 
return used in the industry and reported in PPMs: (2) PME, which measures total value created in 
excess of the benchmark of the CRSP US stock index; (3) MIRR (modified internal rate of return), 
                                                 
10 Six of the thirteen excluded firms were raising regional funds and showed the track record for that region only, three 
firms included the track record of current management alone, and the final four firms included only the investments that 
fell within the mandate of the new fund. There may be a concern that some PE firms show a selected track record but do 
not say so. To assess this potential problem, we first went to the databases of Thomson and Capital IQ and verified that 
all the investments reported for each of our PE firms in those databases were also in our dataset. We find it to be the case. 
Second, we read the legal disclaimers of our PPMs. The typical PPM disclaimer states that the fund has “taken all 
reasonable care to ensure that the facts stated in the Memorandum are true and accurate in all material respects and there 
are no other facts, the omission of which would make misleading any statement in the Memoranda, whether of fact or of 
opinion. The General Partner accepts responsibility accordingly.” Typically, the firm is only exempted from liability for 
estimates of economic trends, projected performance, forward looking statements, and economic and market information 
prepared by third parties. Third, we mentioned this concern to the investors who provided us with the PPM and to 
industry lawyers. They dismissed the concern arguing that the legal disclaimer limiting the responsibility of the firm 
applies in practice only to forecasts and that a PE firm misrepresenting its past investment record could be sued. They 
also pointed out to us that, unlike hedge fund investors, PE investors know the investments made by the firm because 
investors are asked  to provide capital for each investment separately and they receive audited annual reports containing 
the list of investments. Finally, they argued that new investors generally ask old investors about their experience with the 
PE firm. In these circumstances, excluding past investments from the PPM could cause great damage to the firm. 
11 These forty-nine track records are part of forty-three different PPMs. Of these forty-three PPMs: (i) twenty-seven have 
one track record but it is not the track record of the firm that is raising funds, these are all first-time funds; (ii) eleven 
have a track record of a firm other than the one raising funds; (iii) four have two track records of a firm other than the 
one raising funds; and (iv) one has three track records of a firm other than the one raising funds. Since we eliminate the 
track records that do not belong to the firm that is raising funds, we exclude a total of forty-nine track records. 
12 If we excluded all the investments held at cost we risk introducing an upward bias since these transactions could have 
performed less well than those exited quickly. We chose two years as the break point because the percentage of 
investments held-at-cost goes down substantially to 11% and 8% of all investments made three and four years before the 
date of the PPM.   
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which alleviates potential problems with the re-investment assumption used to compute IRR 
(Ljungqvist et al. 2007); and (4) multiple. These columns show that each filter, with the exception of 
the last, leaves performance virtually unaffected. Excluding investments made within two years of 
the date of the PPM does increase the performance of the sample because, as mentioned above, 
nearly half have an IRR of 0%. In the robustness section, we restore some categories of excluded 
investments and show that the results still hold. 
< Table III > 
 
II.B. Basic Statistics for Private Equity Investments 
Table IV presents descriptive statistics that provide new information on several debates in the 
literature. The table shows the basic statistics of PE investments, including several performance 
measures (median IRR, PME, MIRR, and multiple), and the fraction of investments that went 
bankrupt (returning no equity to investors) or that could be described as home runs (IRR greater than 
50%) or quick flips (held for less than two years). It also provides numbers on the median duration, 
the median investment size, and our measure for firm scale, which is the average number of 
simultaneous investments (SI) held by the firm over the life of the focal investment. These statistics 
are shown for our full sample of 7,453 observations and for several subsamples that classify 
investments by exit route (panel A), duration (panel B), size (panel C), country of investment (panel 
D), and year of investment initiation (panel E). Figure 1 complements the data with histograms of 
performance, duration, and size. The detailed definition of each variable is provided in table A.1. 
< Table IV > < Figure 1 > 
The first row of panel A describes the full sample. The median investment has an IRR of 
21%, an MIRR of 17%, a PME of 1.27, and a multiple of 1.90. The numbers are comparable to the 
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returns found in studies using cash flows to investors (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar 2005).13 A unique 
feature of our data is that we have the distribution of performance. Table 4 shows that 10% of all 
investments went bankrupt while 25% of the deals were home runs. Figure 1 gives more details 
about the cross-section of performance. There is a much greater dispersion of individual investment 
returns than of fund returns (Kaplan and Schoar 2005). A quarter of investments either go bankrupt 
or fail to provide gains to investors; half earn less than 50% percent, and the final quarter post an 
IRR above 50%. The distribution of PME is very similar; nearly 40% of investments have a PME 
less than 1 and nearly 20% have a PME greater than 3. This dramatic and fat-tailed return 
distribution has implications for performance and risk evaluation.  
The rest of the numbers describing the full sample provide important additional statistics that 
we explore in other panels of table IV. The median investment is (equity stake) $15 million, lasts 
about four years, and is held along with seventeen other investments in the firm’s portfolio; in other 
words, the median number of simultaneous investments (SI) for our sample is eighteen. Finally, only 
12% of investments are quick flips, a percentage similar to that in Strömberg (2007) for Capital IQ 
data.  
The bottom rows of panel A split investments by type of exit to explore the common 
association in the literature between fund performance and the fraction of investments exited through 
an IPO. About 22% of the investments for which we know the exit route are exited by an IPO. Our 
data shows that IPO-exited investments do have higher returns than the rest. Yet investments exited 
through a sale (a trade sale or secondary buyout) or recapitalization, refinancing, or other methods 
also perform well. The performance statistics for these subgroups suggest that these deals could also 
                                                 
13 Our median statistics cannot be interpreted as the overall performance of the private equity industry. Since we do not 
have the detailed cash flows, it is difficult to aggregate performance in a meaningful way. As we show below, most of the 
high performing investments are short-lived, so a buy-and-hold investor obtains a return much lower than the average 
investment IRR. Yet if we consider the typical fees, which are around 15% of capital invested (Metrick and Yasuda 
2010), the median PME after fees in our sample would be close to one, which is similar to what Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) find.  
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be considered successful transactions; the importance formerly accorded the fraction of IPOs as the 
basic measure of success may have been overstated, at least for PE investments. 
The evidence in figure 1 and panel B of table IV provides two pieces of evidence on the role 
of PE firms. First, the distribution of investment duration does not suggest that PE firms are merely 
flipping deals. The third graph of figure 1 shows that nearly half of the deals are held between three 
and four years, and nearly 20% for more than six years.14 However, panel B provides a second piece 
of evidence that shows a strong negative relationship between performance and duration. The median 
IRR (MIRR) of the investments held less than two years is 85% (79%) and the median PME 
(multiple) is 1.94 (2.40). In contrast, the 1,347 investments held longer than six years have 
significantly lower returns with a median IRR (MIRR) of 8% (6%) and a median PME (multiple) of 
0.79 (1.59). Our data allows us to understand and put in context recent criticism in the press 
suggesting that flashy PE returns come mainly from quick flips.15 In addition, although our data does 
not identify the specific actions associated with the high returns of short-lived deals, it suggests that 
it does not take too long to carry them out. The high returns on these deals may be the result of quick 
operational or financial therapy by the PE firm (Rappaport 1990), or of the ability of PE firms to buy 
low and sell high fairly quickly as a result of greater bargaining power or ability to time the debt-
equity market (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009).  
The connection between duration and returns may also help us understand the poor post-IPO 
performance of listed quick flips documented in Cao and Lerner (2009). The low performance post-
IPO of quick-flips may be the result of investors extrapolating too optimistically the high pre-IPO 
returns documented in panel B rather than of these deals having received little added value. More 
detailed evidence about these transactions is needed for a fuller picture. 
                                                 
14 These statistics are similar to those in Strömberg (2007), confirming that our dataset appears representative. 
15 One of those press articles argues that “over the last three years, private equity firms have had record returns through a 
series of quick flips. In recent months, several high-profile quick flips have left critics wondering whether buyout firms 
were using such offerings simply to line their pockets, rather than using the proceeds to support companies.” 
(November 13, 2005. New York Times. The Great Global Buyout Bubble). 
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After exploring duration, panel C of table IV presents statistics by investment size. We do not 
observe any significant differences in performance across size categories. More interestingly, 
perhaps, this panel and the complementary graph in figure 1 show that most PE investments are quite 
small. The median (average) size of the investments in our sample is only $15 ($36) million (2006 
US dollars). Nearly 20% of the deals involve less than $5 million of equity. The multi-billion-dollar 
deals covered in the press are in fact a small minority: only 10% of the investments in our sample 
involve more than $100 million of equity. 
Panel D of table IV provides statistics by country of investment. Investments in developed 
countries have similar duration and performance, although Scandinavian deals stand out with higher 
PME (1.66 versus 1.33 for the US) and lower bankruptcy rates (5% versus 12% for the US). 
Investments in developing countries, however, seem different. They exhibit poorer performance 
across all measures, with the exception of bankruptcy rate. We might have expected to see the 
opposite as a result of the higher cost of capital in developing countries. The low returns of these 
deals may be the result of a combination of such factors as costly learning, lower leverage, poorer 
legal environments, and limited exit routes (Cumming and Walz 2010; Lerner and Schoar 2004).16 
The last panel of table IV (panel E) shows statistics by year of investment initiation. The size 
of investments increases over time. The median deal was less than $13 million every year until 1997. 
By 2005, at $44 million, it had more than tripled. The increase in fund size over time probably 
allowed funds to target larger companies in later years. Similar to the findings in Strömberg (2007), 
our data shows no evidence of an increased frequency of quick flips over time. It does, however, 
show a cyclical pattern with a higher frequency of quick flips during good times. Until 1986, the 
heyday of the junk bond market and just two years before the peak of the first PE cycle, performance 
measures are all statistically significantly higher than during the rest of the period and quick flips 
                                                 
16 In terms of industry composition, we find a substantial number of deals in each of the forty-eight Fama-French 
industries (non-tabulated). The notion that PE focuses heavily on cash-rich industries is not borne out by our data. 
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peaked at 28% of all investments made in 1986. After that year, the sharp decline in quick flips 
coincides with the collapse of the junk bond market and declining investment returns. The frequency 
of quick flips bottoms out at 6% in 1990. The evidence of the recent cycle is quite similar: quick flips 
peaked at 18% in 2005, two years, once again, before the end of the cycle; and performance 
measures were substantially higher for the investment cohorts between 2002 and 2005.17  
 
III. Determinants of the Performance of Private Equity Investments 
The great difference in investment returns calls for a formal analysis of the determinants of 
performance. This is the main goal of this section, in which we pay particular attention to the role of 
diseconomies of scale. Because of the similarity of results across all performance measures, we stop 
presenting results for MIRR and multiple in the rest of the paper. In the first sub-section we explain 
the construction of our measure of scale diseconomies. The rest of the section explores diseconomies 
of scale in a regression setup and uncovers other determinants of the performance of PE investments. 
 
III.A. Firm Scale and Investment Performance 
As explained in the introduction, the theoretical connection between firm scale and returns 
implies that, as the PE firm scales up, its larger communication costs outweigh the benefits of its 
higher knowledge utilization rate. To implement this idea in our setting, we conjecture that if during 
the life of investment i the PE firm holds many other investments simultaneously, it is possible that 
the quality of the communication and the attention provided to investment i may be lower, ultimately 
leading to poorer performance. A simple illustration may help explain this idea.  
                                                 
17 These time-series variation in returns is consistent with the evidence in Kaplan (1989), who finds significant 
operational improvements in the companies that PE firms invested in during the 1980s, the evidence in Guo, Hotchkiss, 
and Song (2010) and Leslie and Oyer (2008), who show that PE firms made fewer operational improvements in the 
companies that they invested in during the 1990s, and the evidence in Acharya et al. (2009) and Nikoskelainen and 
Wright (2005),who find significant operational improvements for a subset of UK investments in more recent years.  
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Consider two PE firms identical in every respect except in the number of their personnel. 
Firm A has two partners and four staff members, whereas firm B, five times larger, has ten partners 
and twenty staff members. In theory, firm B could be organized into five independent teams of two 
partners and four staff members each and therefore be in a position to make five times more 
investments than firm A. All else being equal, we should not expect the performance of the 
investments of firm A to be any different from that of firm B. Firm B, however, is unlikely to operate 
as five independent units, as its partners may need to agree on strategic decisions, and the employees 
need to communicate with each other and pass along information about the investments. Although 
firm B has a larger knowledge pool, the communication of soft information about each investment is 
more difficult and may lead to lengthier discussions that could prevent timely decision-making 
(Garicano 2000). Moreover, as argued in Stein (2002), some information may get lost as employees 
in charge of an investment report to the partner above them, who in turn reports to the rest of the 
partners. All of these factors may lower the quality of the decisions and lead to lower returns for firm 
B. 
As we argued in the introduction, our data is particularly suited to addressing this setup. If we 
assume that each investment requires a similar amount of attention and communication, we can 
measure firm scale at any point in time as the total number of investments managed simultaneously 
by the firm at that moment. Because we have individual investment returns, we can calculate this 
measure for each investment by computing the average number of simultaneous investments (SI) of 
the PE firm across all months of the investment’s life (from the month of investment initiation to the 
month of exit) (see table A.1 for a more detailed definition). 
The last column of table IV shows the median number of simultaneous investments for the 
full sample and for the various subsamples of investments discussed in the previous section. The 
median investment in our full sample has eighteen simultaneous investments (SI). Bankrupt and very 
large investments have a higher SI, whereas those of shorter duration have a lower SI. SI for 
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investments in the UK (twenty-five) and Germany (twenty-eight) is higher than that for the rest of 
the sample. Panel E also shows that SI has increased steadily over time and that in 2005 median SI 
peaked at twenty-four. 
 
III.B. Regression Analysis 
In the rest of the section, we explore empirically the connection between scale and returns in 
a multivariate context. Table V develops our “base specification” that controls for potential 
determinants of returns other than firm scale. Starting with this table, we present regressions with the 
IRR (panel A) and PME (panel B) of investments as dependent variables. All independent variables 
are expressed as a z-score (that is, we subtract the sample mean and divide by the standard deviation 
of the sample).18 Standard errors are obtained by two-dimensional clustering (firm and time) to 
account for the dependence in residuals within a given firm and a given year, since SI may exhibit 
some time-series persistence and PE performance is cyclical. 
The first specification of each panel regresses investment IRR or PME on the log of SI and 
fixed effects for time, country, and industry of the investment. We control for time fixed effects to 
capture such important time-dependent drivers of performance as the number of “money-chasing 
deals” or credit conditions at the time of investment initiation (Ljungqvist et al. 2007; Gompers and 
Lerner 2000; Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg and Weisbach 2010). We also control for investment 
location and industry fixed effects to capture risk differences.19 In this first specification, the 
coefficient of the log of SI is negative and statistically significant at one percent. The magnitude of 
                                                 
18 This means that regression coefficients measure the change in the dependent variable arising from a one-standard-
deviation increase in the independent variable. The transformation has no impact on inference but allows us to make 
direct comparisons of the economic magnitude of the different explanatory variables. 
19 The specifications do not show each fixed effect. We find that investments initiated before the peak of PE cycles (that 
is, from 1984 to 1986 and from 2002 to 2005) have higher returns, whereas those initiated from 1998 to 2000 have lower 
returns. Several country fixed effects are also significant. The two strongest country effects are the positive coefficients 
for Swedish and Finish investments. We do not find any significant industry fixed effect. 
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the scale effect is large: a one-standard-deviation increase in the log of SI decreases IRR by 8.4% 
annually and lowers PME by 0.142. 
< Table V > 
Although specification 1 suggests that the hypothesis of diseconomies of scale holds for PE 
firms, several of the panels in table IV indicate that such variables as market conditions and firm and 
investment characteristics may also account for some of the great variation in PE investment returns. 
The investments made by small firms may differ from those of large firms in ways that must be 
controlled for. Specifications 2 to 6 of table V test the explanatory power of other potential 
determinants of performance. We introduce each variable one at a time keeping investment time, 
country, and industry fixed effects. The detailed definition of all variables is provided in table A.1. 
In specification 2 we explore the connection between private and public equity markets. Our 
measure of “market return” for each investment is the average return of the CRSP value-weighted 
index over the life of the investment. This variable captures the change in equity valuations from the 
start of the life of the investment to the exit date. Stock-market performance has a significant impact 
on IRR: a one-standard-deviation increase in market return increases IRR by 13.7%. Market return is 
not significant, however, for PME. It may be because beta is close to one, so PME (the value added 
in addition to the stock market) is unrelated to stock-market returns. 
The risk characteristics of investments may also be a major determinant of returns. For this 
reason, specifications 3 and 4 introduce risk proxies in addition to the fixed effects already 
considered. In specification 3, we introduce the log of investment size as an additional risk measure. 
We find that there is a significant negative relationship between size and both investment 
performance measures. Specification 4 adds a risk measure suggested by Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2004), who argue that private equity firms that hold higher total risk should be expected to 
outperform. To proxy for the volatility of a PE firm’s portfolio, we use the volatility and the cross-
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industry correlations of publicly traded companies in the same industry. Specification 4 shows that 
portfolio volatility is positively but only weakly related to performance. 
Specifications 5 and 6 in table V introduce variables to control for PE firm characteristics that 
may be linked to its scale. First, as a result of different horizon preferences or of firm skills that 
affect their ability to exit deals, not all PE firms hold their investments for the same length of time. 
All else equal, firms holding investments longer would be expected to be running more investments 
simultaneously. To take this possibility into account, in specification 5 we compute the average 
duration of all investments held by the firm other than the focal investment. Specification 6, which 
introduces the firm’s age, adds another potential firm-specific factor. PE firm performance may 
improve over time so controlling for past experience is important. Results show that the duration of 
the rest of the portfolio and firm age are weakly related to returns only when measured by IRR.  
The final specification of the table is our base specification, which includes all the previously 
introduced variables plus the log of SI. The base specification shows that, holding SI constant, all 
other determinants of returns have effects similar to those in previous specifications, with the 
exception of portfolio volatility, which loses its impact. And even after other determinants of returns 
are controlled for, scale is strongly negatively related to investment performance for both IRR and 
PME. The economic magnitude of the log of SI is unaffected by all of these control variables. 
 
IV. Robustness  
In this section, we do six sets of checks to assess the robustness of diseconomies of scale. 
First, we split investments into SI deciles to look at the risk differences between investments in lower 
and higher scale groups. Second, we take the base specification of table V and show that the scale 
effect is not driven by a specific sub-set of observations or by some of the methodology choices we 
make. We also remove the effect of duration from SI to ensure that diseconomies of scale are not a 
simple mechanical outcome resulting from firms selling their best investments faster. Third, because 
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our data may suffer from a survivorship bias, we collect information on “dead” firms and add their 
investments, making conservative assumptions about their performance. Fourth, we present results 
with fund and firm fixed effects. Fifth, we test for the possibility of reverse causality. Finally, we 
aggregate investments at the fund and firm levels. The negative scale effect found in the previous 
section survives all of these robustness checks. 
 
IV.A. Assessing Risk: Decile Analysis 
Country fixed effects, industry fixed effects, portfolio volatility, and investment size capture 
some of the differences in risk across investments in the base specification. But since these are only 
proxies, we verify further that low-SI investments are not simply riskier than high-SI deals. In table 
VI, we do an additional risk assessment by splitting investments into SI deciles and calculating 
Value-at-Risk measures and variances across deciles.  
The first two rows show the lower and upper bounds of SI in each decile. The range of SI is 
extremely large: investments in the lowest-SI decile have less than six simultaneous investments, 
whereas investments in the highest-SI decile have more than fifty-eight. For each SI decile the table 
provides several statistics similar to those in table IV. The last column shows the difference between 
the lowest and the highest deciles and its statistical significance.  
Consistent with the base specification results, the performance statistics in table VI show that 
investments held at times of fewer simultaneous investments post higher returns. The magnitude of 
the performance difference is substantial. Investments in the lowest-SI decile have a median IRR of 
36% and a median PME of 1.65, whereas those at the other end of the spectrum post a median IRR 
of only 16% and a median PME of 1.08. Figure 2 complements the evidence by plotting the 
performance measures across SI deciles and shows that the differences are not limited to the 
comparisons between the lowest and the highest deciles. There is a marked downward slope across 
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all performance measures. In addition, investments in the lowest-SI decile are of a duration ten 
months shorter than that of those in the highest-SI decile, and are quick-flipped twice as often. 
< Figure 2 > < Table VI > 
Although the nature of the data prevents us from constructing a direct measure of systematic 
risk, we can assess the risk differences by looking at Value-at-Risk measures across SI deciles. An 
advantage of these measures is that they are not sensitive to the non-normality of return distribution. 
Table VI shows that deals in low-SI deciles are less likely to lose money, underperform the stock 
market, and go bankrupt than are those in high-SI deciles. These Value-at-Risk measures indicate 
that low-SI investments are less rather than more risky. Moreover, low SI deciles are characterized 
by higher rates of home runs (IRR above 50%) and strong outperformers (PME above 2).  
The bottom of table VI presents statistics on the variance of performance. They show that 
low-SI deciles have higher variance, but the variance difference is driven by the high performers. 
Investments losing money have practically the same variance across SI deciles. On the whole, the 
statistics in this table do not support the view that small-scale PE firms hold riskier investments. 
 
IV.B. Sample Selection, Methodology, and Investment Subsamples  
In table VII, we assess the robustness of the negative scale effect to our sample selection and 
methodological choices. Each row of table VII subjects our base specification to a different check. 
For each regression, we show the coefficient for the log of SI, the adjusted R-squared, and the 
number of observations. Panel A presents results for IRR and panel B for PME. The message of table 
VII is simple: diseconomies of scale are not driven by our methodology and are present across scale 
sub-samples, time sub-periods, and different investment locations. 
The first part of panels A and B checks the robustness of our findings to the sample selection 
choices and the inference approach used for observations with some missing information. The first 
four rows reproduce the base specification results, excluding four different groups of investments. 
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First, we exclude the 1,617 unrealized investments because of the flexibility in valuing non-
liquidated deals. In the second row, we also exclude all partially realized investments. The regression 
in the third row excludes the 1,024 investments for which IRR was not reported in the PPM and we 
had to infer it from the investment’s duration and multiple (see table A.3.) Finally, the fourth row 
shows regression results excluding all three groups of investments mentioned above. Although the 
sample is sharply reduced by some of these exclusions, the negative scale effect survives with a 
similar and significant coefficient.  
Instead of excluding observations, the fifth row of table VII restores to the sample used in the 
base specification all the investments initiated within two years of the writing of the PPM. As in the 
previous rows, the significance of the scale effect remains but the magnitude falls by 15%. 
< Table VII > 
 The second part of each panel of table VII presents robustness results using alternative 
methodological choices. Since IRR and PME can take on very high values, the base specification 
winsorized these measures at their ninety-fifth percentile. Specification 6 in each panel shows that 
the scale effect is very similar when we winsorize at the ninety-ninth percentile. In specification 7 we 
switch from OLS to a Tobit regression that takes into account that IRR cannot be less than -100% 
and PME cannot be less than zero. Firm scale is still statistically significant. In specification 8 we 
consider the possibility that the scale effect may be a mechanical result of PE firms selling their best-
performing investments faster and SI naturally increasing over the life of the firm. Figure 2 and the 
correlations in table A.4 certainly suggest this may be a possibility. To deal with this issue, we 
remove the effect of duration from SI by regressing the log of SI on investment duration20 and using 
the residual log of SI from this regression instead of the log of SI. Scale diseconomies are still 
significant at a 1% level test, although the effect is slightly weaker.  
                                                 
20 The coefficient of duration on the log of SI is negative with a t-statistic of 6.91. 
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The rest of the specifications in table VII present results using different investment 
subsamples. The scale decile results in table VI and figure 2 suggest that the scale effect could be 
driven only by the lowest SI deciles. To check this possibility, specifications 9 and 10 present our 
base regression with the sample split above and below median SI. Diseconomies of scale are similar 
in both subsamples. Rows 11 and 12 split the sample in 1995 to see if the scale effect is present in 
the two different PE industry cycles.21 SI is significant at a 1% level test in both sub-periods but the 
effect is twice as large for the first time period. The relatively lower magnitude of the scale effect in 
the second period may be the result of investors starting to arbitrage away the effect. In addition, our 
sample ends before the 2007 financial crisis. High-SI firms experienced large returns from 2002 to 
2005 and recent anecdotal evidence suggests that these firms may have been among those that 
suffered the most with the crisis.22 So it is possible that if we had post-crisis data the diseconomies of 
scale in the second cycle would be of a magnitude similar to those of the first cycle. 
 The last 3 rows of table VII split the sample into groups of countries. The descriptive 
statistics presented in panel D of table IV show that 40% of our sample are US investments. So, it is 
important to verify that the scale effect holds for investments inside and outside the US. We present 
results for investments in the US, other developed countries, and developing countries. For both IRR 
and PME the scale effect is strongest for the subsample of developing countries and smallest for that 
of other developed countries. The negative scale effect for US investments is smaller than for 
developing countries, but about a third larger than that for other developed countries. 
 
                                                 
21 Although our data starts in 1973, panel E of table 4 shows that the buyout industry really takes off in the mid 1980s. 
So, splitting our sample in 1995 allows us to capture the differences across the two decades of large PE activity.  
22 A recent Moody's research report, “$640 Billion & 640 Days Later: How Companies Sponsored by Big Private Equity 
Have Performed during the U.S. Recession,” points out that in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the worst 
performing deals are those made by large PE firms. According to the report, “it appears that when you do a large dollar 
value transaction and you lever that company up, you seem to be at more risk of having problems in a downturn.” 
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IV.C. Survivorship Bias 
It is common for PE firms to start small, with a handful of investments, and to grow as they 
raise additional funds. So, there can be survivorship bias that creates a spurious relationship between 
scale and performance if small PE firms give up raising funds following poor performance and we 
fail to include them in our sample.23 For at least two reasons, the evidence presented in the previous 
sections should alleviate the concern over this bias. First, our base specification already controls for 
firm age at the time of the investment. If survivorship bias were a major problem, we would expect 
firm age to be negatively related to returns. But this is not the case. Second, the survivorship bias 
argument is a cross-year effect: investments in the 1980s should outperform investments in the 1990s 
because they are the survivors. Since our base specification includes time fixed effects, we make sure 
that this mechanism is not in play, and our results can be interpreted as within-year effects.  
Although these results are reassuring, in table VIII we take a more direct approach to dealing 
with the potential survivorship bias in our sample. We use the Thomson PE firm directory of past 
years to retrieve firms that stopped fund raising and collect information on the investments made by 
these firms to “complete” our sample.24 We define as “dead” those PE firms that, according to 
Thomson, did not raise a new fund after 2000. Most dead firms are small: nearly 90% of them are in 
the bottom quartile of the size distribution of the firms in our database. PE firms, unlike hedge funds 
and mutual funds, have only rarely gone bust. We identified forty-five dead PE firms that had made a 
total of 464 investments. The average (median) number of simultaneous investments of dead firms is 
fifteen (nine). Since we do not have the returns of these investments, we impute a very conservative 
return to each of them according to their exit status.25 To run regressions similar to those we have 
                                                 
23 We are in a better situation than in the case of small hedge funds, which tend to report only after they have done 
well. Unlike hedge funds, PE funds do not choose whether to report performance or not. PE firms need to raise money to 
survive and so to show what they have done. 
24 Thomson is the database with most comprehensive PE firm coverage in early years. 
25 We assign a –100% return to any investment reported as defunct (32%) or without an exit (11%). For investments 
exited via an IPO (12% of the sample), we assign half of the median IRR and PME of IPO-exited investment in our 
sample (21% IRR and 1.09 PME). Finally, to investments exited via a sale (45% of the sample), we assign half of the 
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been presenting, we also calculate the rest of the control variables in the base specification for each 
of the investments made by dead PE firms.  
The first two regressions of table VIII present the results when the 464 investments of dead 
firms are added to our sample. That the magnitude of the scale effect is reduced is, in view of the low 
returns we assigned these investments, hardly surprising. But the reduction is small and the statistical 
significance of the scale effect remains strong. To be even more conservative and cover the 
possibility that Thomson missed half of the dead PE firms, the last two regressions of table 8 
artificially double the number of investments made by dead firms. Although we are adding nearly 
one thousand investments made by dead firms, the coefficient on SI decreases only marginally and 
remains significant. These results suggest that it would take an implausible number of dead firms for 
survivorship bias to account for diseconomies of scale. 
< Table VIII > 
 
IV.D. Firm and Fund Fixed Effects 
Including firm and fund fixed effects makes it possible to control for unobserved fixed fund 
and firm characteristics and thus addresses problems with omitted variables. Some important 
investment characteristics are determined at the firm or fund level. For instance, one may argue that 
manager efforts would be positively related to performance but negatively related to SI. Indeed, the 
professionals of small PE firms have better incentives because they typically have a larger carried 
interest, they are said to be “closer to the carry.” Since all the investments in a fund have the same 
carry distribution among employees of the firm, a fund fixed effect helps control for such differences 
in incentives. In addition, we could argue that firms and funds differ in their styles, attitudes to risk 
taking, or strategies and that these differences may be an important omitted variable in our regression 
analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
median IRR of the sale-exited investments in our sample (18% IRR and 0.85 PME).  
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Table IX reruns our base specification with firm and fund fixed effects. The first two 
specifications with firm fixed effects continue to show significant diseconomies of scale for both 
IRR and PME.26 A large part of the negative effect of scale seems to take place within the firms. 
Firms that grow their SI beyond their average SI see significant performance deterioration. The last 
two regressions in table 19 show that results with fund fixed effects are similar to those with firm 
fixed effects. Our sample for fund fixed effects includes 590 different funds with only 6,358 
investments because in some PPMs investments are listed without specifying the fund that made 
them. On the whole, the evidence suggests that neither firm nor fund unobservable characteristics are 
the main driver of diseconomies of scale.  
< Table IX > 
 
IV.E. Reverse Causality 
 The next issue we address is the classic concern of reverse causality. A common test to deal 
with this problem is to lag the variable of interest. But in our setup this test may be particularly weak 
because SI does not change much from one investment to the next. For this reason, we create two-
year “investment blocks” containing all the investments initiated by a firm within a specific two-year 
window. With this method, we create 1,170 two-year investment blocks in our dataset. For each 
block, we compute the average log of SI, market return, and investment size for all investments in 
the block, as well as the volatility of returns across all block investments. Finally, as Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) did for their funds, we measure experience with the log of the block sequence number 
in the firm’s track record. 
                                                 
26 Coefficients obtained with and without fund/firm fixed effects are not strictly comparable. The coefficient of the log of 
SI in table 9 should be read as the negative scale effect as the firm/fund increases its scale above its average. This 
interpretation points to a mechanical bias introduced with the use of fund/firm fixed effects in our setting. If a PE firm 
starts out small and gets bigger as a result of abnormally good performance, its performance in the periods when it is 
bigger will look below average when compared to a firm-specific mean. This mechanical effect may explain the 
substantially larger magnitude of the diseconomies of scale in the fixed-effects regressions. 
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Table X shows results in which the units of observation are the two-year investment blocks 
we created. We start by replicating our base specification in specification 1 for two-year investment 
blocks. The results are very similar to those in previous tables. Specifications 2 and 3 show that 
lagged firm scale has a strong relation to current block performance. This result holds for both one-
block and two-block lags in both panels and it means that the SI of investments initiated more than 
two years before the investments in the focal block is significantly negatively related to the 
performance of the focal investments, thereby alleviating concerns about reverse causality 
Specifications 4 and 5 test if the growth of SI between the earlier and the current block of 
investments (the difference in the means of the log of SI in successive blocks) is related to 
performance. We find that scale growth is negatively related to performance, but its significance is 
low in the PME specifications. Moreover, SI remains statistically significant when we control for 
scale growth (specification 5). On the whole, the results in table X suggest that reverse causality is 
hardly likely to be a major concern for our sample. 
< Table X > 
 
IV.F. Fund- and Firm-Level Analysis 
 To close the section on robustness, we look at the evidence when we aggregate investments 
by fund. There are three benefits to this approach.27 First, results by fund allow us to benchmark our 
findings to the results in Kaplan and Schoar (2005). Second, it could be argued that investors care 
about fund return volatility. Funds with more investments are more diversified and can thus offer 
lower returns. Although this hypothesis is very similar to that we tested by controlling for portfolio 
volatility, fund-level evidence is an alternative means of addressing this issue. Finally, showing inter-
                                                 
27 There are also drawbacks. First, the aggregation generally reduces statistical power. Second, we lose valuable 
investment information, such as investment year, country, and industry. Third, a sizable part of the scale effect is present 
within-fund and is thus lost. Fourth, we lose a number of observations by restricting the sample to funds that are old 
enough, as explained in the text. Fifth, since the average investment IRR differs from the IRR of the fund, our measure of 
fund return is a noisier proxy than the returns of individual investments.  
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fund effects complements the within-fund results just presented. If the diseconomies of scale were 
present only within funds, it would be hard for investors to arbitrage. But if they are also present 
inter-fund, investors who can anticipate SI may earn abnormal returns.  
To do fund-level analysis, we must recalculate all our variables accordingly. To obtain fund 
performance, we compute the average IRR and PME of all the investments in each fund.28 We must 
also restrict the analysis to funds that have finished their investment period, and since this is not 
observable, we can assume only that, as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005), it is the typical five years. For 
this reason, we lose some investments in our sample, which leaves us with a fund-level sample of 
471 funds and 5,570 underlying investments.  
Fund-level results are shown in table XI for IRR (panel A) and PME (panel B). We start by 
benchmarking our results to those of Kaplan and Schoar (2005). Since they consider only US funds, 
specifications 1 to 3 of each panel are run on this subset of funds. The first specification of each 
panel is the equivalent of our base specification for investments aggregated by fund for all US funds. 
It shows that the log of SI remains statistically significant for both performance measures. 
Specifications 2 and 3 reproduce those in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) with our US-fund sample. As in 
their study, we find a negative relationship between PE fund size and performance (specification 2) 
and a increasing and concave relationship between fund size and performance (specification 3). 
Likewise, neither of these coefficients is statistically significant. The rest of the specifications in the 
table use the full (worldwide) sample of funds. Except that the log of fund size squared changes from 
negative to positive, the results closely mimic those of US funds. The log of SI is still significant in 
the worldwide sample even when we hold fund size constant in the last specification of the table.  
We have also done the same analysis at firm level. We obtain the same findings showing 
significant diseconomies of scale.29 These results also suggest that SI may capture different elements 
                                                 
28 The averages are value-weighted by investment size. 
29 Results aggregating investments by firm are not included here but are available from the authors on request.  
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of these diseconomies. A fund may be small, but if it runs several funds at the same time, it may 
have a large number of simultaneous investments to monitor. In the next section, we analyze 
additional proxies for scale and attempt to shed light on some of the mechanisms behind 
diseconomies of scale.  
< Table XI > 
 
V. Alternative Scale Measures and the Mechanisms of Diseconomies of Scale 
The evidence of diseconomies of scale presented in the previous sections is consistent with 
the theoretical arguments in the literature (Garicano 2000; Stein 2002). But although we believe that 
SI captures major features connecting scale and returns in PE firms, there are certainly other proxies 
we can consider with our data. These alternative measures enable us to test additional predictions of 
the theoretical models. In the last part of the section, we test for potential mechanisms behind 
diseconomies of scale. In particular, we develop proxies to test Stein’s (2002) idea that more 
hierarchical firms and those in which communication is more difficult may exhibit larger 
diseconomies of scale. 
 
V.A. Alternative Scale Measures of the Activity in the Firm 
The documented diseconomies of scale suggest that firms that “do too much” do less well. 
But there may be alternative dimensions to doing too much. It may be that what matters is not so 
much the number of projects in the firm as the amount of assets under management or the (industry) 
scope of such projects or the actual number of projects managed by each employee. We look at the 
impact of these alternative proxies in table XII. The first four rows of the table present results using 
four alternative measures of activity in the PE firm for IRR (panel A) and for PME (panel B). All 
regressions in the table include the same controls as our base specification in table V. Each row 
shows the most relevant parameters of two econometric specifications. The first specification uses all 
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the controls of our base specification in table V, adding the alternative measure specified in the first 
column of the table. The second specification includes the log of SI as an additional regressor to 
ascertain if the effect of the alternative measure remains when SI is held constant.30  
The first and possibly simplest alternative measure of scale we can test for with our data is 
the total (equity) size of the portfolio under management. The literature on venture capital provides 
some empirical evidence of links between this measure and returns. Cumming and Dai (2010) show 
that venture capital firms that have more assets under management end up buying companies at 
higher prices. In the context of our paper, we can proxy for assets under management with the 
average of total equity invested in investments held simultaneously by the PE firm over the life of 
the focal investment. The first row of table XII shows that the inclusion of the log of such a measure 
(Log EUM) is negatively related to returns, but only if the log of SI is not included. In other words, 
although EUM and SI are highly correlated, the proxy for the size of the portfolio under management 
loses its significance when the log of SI is controlled for. 
A second measure of activity is firm scope. PE firms investing in multiple industries may 
spread into too many unrelated sectors and lose focus. To test for the impact of diseconomies of 
scope, we follow the methodology in the conglomerate literature and construct two measures: (1) a 
counter of the number of industries in which the PE firm has investments over the life of the focal 
investment; and (2) one minus the industry Herfindhal index for the sectors in which the PE firm 
invests over the life of the focal investment. The second and third rows of each panels A and B of 
table XII present the results of including each of these measures of scope. When introduced alone, 
these measures are statistically and economically significant. Both a higher industry concentration 
and a lower number of industries in the portfolio improve performance. However, the introduction of 
SI renders both scope measures insignificant in most specifications. These findings provide evidence 
                                                 
30 We should be careful about the interpretation of results as several of these proxies are highly correlated with our scale 
measure and with each other (see panel B of table 4-A). 
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for the notion that it is the amount of information that matters (the number of projects) rather than the 
diversity of this information.  
A third proxy for scale is the number of simultaneous investments per employee. One of the 
key insights of the theoretical models mentioned above is that a PE firm with twice as many projects 
and twice as many employees as another PE firm would underperform as a result of its greater 
communication needs. Hence an empirical prediction that we can test is that returns should be more 
closely related to the total number of projects under the firm’s management than to the number of 
projects handled by each employee of the firm.  
Testing this hypothesis required the collection of additional data. We use the Galante Private 
Equity Directory, which lists the “key personnel,” also called “professionals,” in each PE firm. With 
this information, we compute the ratio of the number of simultaneous investments to the number of 
professionals working at the firm in the year in which the investment is initiated.31 Although Galante 
is the best available source, it does not cover all the firms in our sample, since the first edition of 
Galante appeared only in 1996 (covering year 1995) and it sometimes begins coverage of a particular 
firm a few years after it is founded. For these reasons, the number of investments with coverage is 
reduced to a bit more than 40% of our sample. The results of using this proxy are reported in the 
fourth row of each panel of table XII. The estimates show that, with or without controlling for the log 
of SI,32 workload per professional does not have a significant impact on performance.  
< Table XII > 
                                                 
31 Our data shows that PE firms do not scale up human resources proportionately. Regressing the number of professionals 
in the firm during the investment’s initiation year on the number of simultaneous investments (SI) and a constant yields a 
slope of 61% and an R-squared of 36%. 
32 For a subset of firms, the Galante Private Equity Directory also reports the total number of people working at the firm 
under “total staff.” We use this information to compute an alternative measure of employee workload as the log of the 
ratio of SI to the number of total staff working for the PE firm during the investment’s initiation year. The results are 
similar to those presented in table XII. 
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V.B. Scale Measures for Different Investment Phases 
  Our proxy for scale has the advantage of covering the life of the project, which is equivalent 
to the monitoring phase of the investment. This phase usually deals with information of a soft nature, 
and it is during this time that most value-added activities by management are likely to take place. But 
the scale of the PE firm may also matter during the investment selection and divestiture phases. One 
could argue that if there are too many projects in any of these other two phases the information flow 
may also be hampered and returns will suffer. Although there is certainly information that needs to 
be communicated at all times, the nature of the information may differ. During monitoring, 
information is mostly soft, as it pertains to the evolution of the strategy and its implementation. 
During entry and exit, much of the information takes the form of valuation exercises using hard data. 
Our data allows us to test the relative impact on returns of the number of investments in each 
of these three investment phases. Although the number of investments across phases is highly 
correlated (see table A.4), we can attempt to use our large panel to give us enough statistical power 
to distinguish between them as much as possible. Using a method similar to that which we use to 
calculate SI, we put together measures of the number of simultaneous investments at entry and at exit 
of each investment by adding the number of investments initiated or exited by the firm in the three 
months before and the three months after the focal investment initiation or divestment dates.  
These two new proxies also help us analyze an alternative take on our results, an 
interpretation that relates them to the existence of limited financial arbitrage either at entry or at exit. 
This interpretation argues that PE firms have a limited number of “good ideas;” each firm would then 
have a fixed investment opportunity set. If this is the case, when a firm invests in more companies, 
marginal returns will be lower. A similar argument would say that large-scale firms are forced to exit 
too many projects at any given time and the existence of a limited number of potential buyers is the 
reason for their poorer performance. 
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The fifth and sixth rows of panels A and B of table XII present results using the two new 
proxies. As before, we start by adding each of the new measures to our base specification in table V 
without the log of SI. The table shows that in such specifications there is evidence in favor of the two 
alternative measures. The number of investments made (divested) around acquisition (exit) time is 
negatively related to performance. The economic magnitude of these effects is about two-thirds of 
that of the log of SI in the base specification. In addition, the statistical significance of the new 
proxies disappears for most specifications in the table when we control for the log of SI. At the same 
time, the log of SI still has a negative and significant effect on performance. As with some of the 
other proxies, the correlation of these measures is high, but these regressions suggest that, although a 
large number of projects at time of entry or exit may be problematic, the problem seems more severe 
with a large number of projects over the life of the focal investment. 
 The last row of both panels in table XII provides another test of the idea of limited financial 
arbitrage. If the negative returns of larger firms are linked to the existence of a fixed opportunity set 
for each firm, then it is possible that the firm starts with its best investments, leaving the least 
profitable transactions for last. We can test this interpretation by computing the sequence number of 
the focal investment in the sequence of investments made by the firm. The results of using this proxy 
are similar to those just described: investment sequence is statistically and economically significant 
on its own but loses its power once we include the log of SI.33   
To conclude this section, it is important to clarify that our position is not that the alternative 
measures analyzed here are unimportant. There is empirical evidence confirming their role. But SI is 
closer to the theoretical models of diseconomies of scale and seems to dominate other proxies. 
 
                                                 
33 One could still argue that although the firm made only a few investments at the time of the initiation of the focal 
investment, it knew that it would make many investments in the future and therefore lowered its required rate of return 
for the focal investment. We do not have a direct test for these interpretations, but our conversations with practitioners 
indicate that funds cannot readily anticipate future activity. 
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V.C. Testing Mechanisms of Diseconomies of Scale  
To close the empirical part of the paper, we attempt to get at the potential mechanisms of the 
documented diseconomies of scale. Stein (2002) posits that when the information about the projects 
of a firm is of a soft nature hierarchical organizations or firms in which communication is more 
difficult may face greater such diseconomies as information erodes through more management layers 
or cannot be credibly transmitted. We develop three proxies of the organizational structure of PE 
firms to test these ideas.  
The first two measures focus on the concept of hierarchy and management layers of the firm. 
Our first proxy is constructed by separating independent PE firms from those that belong to a 
financial group (non-independent). This classification is based on information provided by the “type 
of organization” field in the Galante Private Equity Directories. In our sample, then, there are 4,900 
investments made by independent firms and 2,322 made by firms part of financial groups. The 
second measure counts the number of different job titles of the key employees listed in Galante 
during the investment's initiation year. This measure is closer to the concept of hierarchy but is 
available for only about one-third of our sample.  
The third measure is a proxy for possible communication breakdowns stemming from the 
diversity of management backgrounds.34 The development of this measure required the collection 
additional data. In particular, we collect the list of professionals working at each PE firm from 
Galante and their biographies from either the PPM (65% of cases) or the PE firms’ websites (35% of 
cases). We classify each professional as having one of three possible backgrounds: finance, 
consulting, or other. Our measure is one minus the Herfindhal index of the professional background 
of the employees working at the PE firm the year of the initiation of the investment. Table A.1 
provides details for the construction of all three measures.  
                                                 
34 Acharya et al. (2009) explore the impact of the skills of partners with different backgrounds. General partners with an 
operational background generate significantly higher outperformance in organic deals, whereas those with a finance 
background generate higher outperformance in M&A deals. 
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< Table XIII-A and Table XIII-B > 
The theoretical prediction is about the cross-effect; that is, flatter organizations or those with 
less diverse management backgrounds should exhibit smaller diseconomies of scale because soft 
information travels more easily. For this reason, table XIII-A assesses the impact of the 
organizational structure of PE firms on investment returns by breaking firms in the sample down by 
the degree to which they are hierarchical and by the diversity of the professional backgrounds of 
their staff. Panel A separates the investments made by independent firms from those made by firms 
belonging to a financial group. Panel B separates the investments made by “flat” firms from those 
made by “steeper” (i.e., more hierarchical) firms. Panel C separates the investments made by firms in 
which the diversity of the background of professionals is above or below the median. Each panel 
presents results for both IRR and PME. 
All three panels yield the same results. Diseconomies of scale are substantially smaller in 
flatter organizations and in those in which management has more homogenous backgrounds. In panel 
A, diseconomies of scale are about half as great for independent firms as they are for firms belonging 
to a financial group. If we look at panel B, which splits the sample by number of management layers, 
the negative scale returns are more than twice as big in steep organizations as they are in flat ones. 
Panel C shows similar results, with companies with more homogenous management exhibiting 
negative scale results only half the size of those with less homogenous management. The difference 
between the coefficients of scale diseconomies across subgroups is statistically significant for all 
three classifications and for both return measures (IRR and PME). We also obtain the same results 
when we run pooled regressions with all the observations and include the interaction terms between 
the log of SI and our measures of hierarchy (results not shown).  
In table XIII-A, we assume that the organizational structure of PE firms is optimized once 
and for all when the firm is set up, which may be too restrictive. It is possible that PE firms optimize 
their hierarchy over time and that organizations that handle more investments may be more 
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hierarchical. Although table XIII-A focuses on the cross-effect and although the endogeneity 
argument is not as clear cut for some of our measures (i.e., independence), we attempt to address the 
issue in table XIII-B.  
In panel A of table XIII-B, we regress each of the three measures of organizational structure 
on firm scale (i.e., the log of SI). Hierarchy and the diversity of professionals’ backgrounds are 
strongly related to scale, but the independence of a PE firm is not. In panels B, C, and D, we run the 
same regressions as in table XIII-A, but we substitute the log of SI for the residual of each of the 
three regressions in panel A.  The results for the measure of independence are very similar to those in 
table XIII. At the same time, panels C and D show stronger results than those in the previous table:  
given the size of PE firms, less hierarchical firms and those with managers of more homogenous 
backgrounds show significantly smaller diseconomies of scale.  
The findings in tables XIII-A and XIII-B are among the first to illustrate empirically some of 
the mechanisms of diseconomies of scale and to link these diseconomies to the higher 
communication costs posited in the theoretical literature.35 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our study makes three main contributions. First, it provides a series of new facts and 
statistics about PE investments that shed light on issues currently being debated in the industry and in 
academe. We show that a large proportion of high-return deals are quick flips and that quick flips are 
cyclical. Second, our paper documents the presence of substantial diseconomies of scale in PE. We 
find that, as the number of simultaneous investments increases, returns fall. Firms pursuing fewer 
investments obtain higher returns. Third, the evidence is consistent with the view that PE 
performance suffers from structural features of the firm that curtail information flows and reduce the 
                                                 
35 An alternative interpretation of our two organization structure variables is that they proxy for the “distance to carry;” 
i.e., non-independent organizations and those with more layers may provide fewer incentives to lower-end managers. If 
we include these two measures in the same regression format as other alternative measures in table 12, neither variable is 
significant. 
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value-added capacity of management in more hierarchical firms and those in which communication 
is more difficult. Although our evidence has narrowed down the number of potential mechanisms of 
diseconomies of scale, there are several other interesting questions that our paper opens up for future 
research. For example, does a large scale hamper management oversight or operational changes?  
To conclude the study, and although it is beyond the scope of the paper, we want to review 
several potential supply-and-demand factors allowing underperforming PE firms to survive. First, as 
shown by Chung et al. (2010), being large increases fees today, but lower returns hurt fees in the 
future. PE firms may have different time horizons, so they may choose different growth rates. 
Therefore, publicly traded PE firms or those run by managers closer to retirement may opt for large 
size today at the cost of poorer future performance. Fund managers with longer horizons may opt to 
remain smaller to ensure a steady income flow in the medium term. These arguments also seem 
consistent with findings in the literature on performance persistence. That literature shows a 
tendency for high-performing firms to restrict their size to remain top performers and for low-
performing firms to offer the lowest returns acceptable to investors (Kaplan and Schoar 2005; 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen 2008; Glode and Green 2008).  
A second possibility is that, as argued by Lerner, Schoar, and Wong (2007), some investors 
are ill-equipped to invest in PE. Firms with extensive track records may find it easier to window 
dress. In addition, less sophisticated investors may be more comfortable investing in large, well-
established firms, which our data shows as poor performers (on average). Metrick (2007) lists the 
firms perceived to be the top tier in venture capital and the few investments that made them famous. 
So, investors may associate the quality of PE firms more closely with a handful of highly successful 
investments than with the full track record.  
A third possibility is that some investors invest in PE for reasons other than returns. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007), for example, report that their data provider is one of the largest PE investors 
and acquires stakes in other companies to generate business for other company divisions (the M&A 
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or the underwriting arm, for example). Large PE firms generate substantial investment banking fees 
that could lead some investors to back investments in hopes of earning the fees. Similarly, there is 
anecdotal evidence that large PE investors are often invited to co-invest in selected investments 
without paying fees. In such circumstances, large PE firms may thus increase the returns of their 
most sophisticated investors. 
A fourth possibility is that investors do not find it easy to back-test fund-selection strategies, 
making learning and optimally adjusting firm size a difficult task. After all, it took us several years to 
build our own dataset. It is also important to bear in mind that arbitrage is difficult in PE, as investors 
cannot really pick and choose; they must take all the investments in a fund. Finally, many investors 
have told us that they are forced to invest large amounts in PE, an obligation that causes them to 
focus on large-scale firms. 
All of these possible explanations of the survival of unprofitable PE funds are promising 
areas of research. If PE firms continue to behave as described by the findings in our paper, a better 
understanding of these issues will be important in the coming years, as giant PE firms, with 
potentially disappointing results, divest.  
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Table I - The sample of PPM and firm track records 
The table describes our sample of PPM and firm track records. Panel A shows the total number of private placement 
memorandum (PPM) collected and their type. Panel B splits PPM by number of PE firm track records contained in each 
PPM and provides the total number of firms and investments in each of the groups. 
 
Panel A: Private placement memoranda (PPM) 
 Number of PPM 
PPM collected 523
PPM of venture capital funds 104
PPM of other alternative funds (timber, real estate, infrastructure, debt, and so on) 29
PPM without track record 73
PPM available for analysis  317
 
 
Panel B: PE firm track records per private placement memorandum (PPM) 
 Number of PPM Number of firms Number of investments
PPM containing one track record 301 301 11,116
PPM containing two track records 15 30 512
PPM containing three track records 1 3 76
Total 317 334 11,704
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Table II - Coverage analysis 
The table compares our sample of PE investments and the two largest commercial databases available: Capital IQ (panel A) and 
Thomson Reuters (panel B). The Capital IQ sample is from Bernstein et al. (2010). The Thomson Reuters sample corresponds to 
the “buyouts and acquisitions” made by all “buyout funds”. Each panel shows the filters applied to make the datasets 
comparable. Sample comparisons are shown splitting investments by period of investment initiation and by investment location. 
 
Panel A: Comparison with Capital IQ data 
 Number of observations in  
 Our dataset Capital IQ Coverage 
Filters to make the samples comparable    
Our initial sample 11,704   
Exclude debt and public equity investments 11,483   
Exclude venture capital investments 10,855   
Exclude post-2005 investments 10,104   
Exclude pre-1986 investments 9,827   
Exclude non-OECD countries 9,062   
Comparison samples 9,062 10,969 83% 
Comparison by period of investment initiation    
1986–1995 2,601 2,020 129% 
1996–2000 3,954 3,398 116% 
2001–2005 2,507 5,217 48% 
Comparison by investment location    
North America 4,055 5,514 74% 
Europe 4,842 4,642 104% 
Other OECD: Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea 165 161 102% 
 
Panel B: Comparison with Thomson Reuters data 
 Number of observations in  
 Our dataset Thomson Reuters Coverage 
Filters to make the samples comparable    
Our initial sample 11,704   
Exclude debt and public equity investments 11,483   
Exclude venture capital investments 10,855   
Exclude post-2005 investments 10,104   
Comparison samples 10,130 10,515 96% 
Comparison by period of investment initiation    
1973–1995 3,014 2,354 128% 
1996–2000 4,327 3,336 130% 
2001–2005 2,789 4,825 58% 
Comparison by investment location    
North America 4,318 5,910 73% 
Europe 4,966 4,122 120% 
Rest of the world 846 483 175% 
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Table III – Construction of the sample of investments 
The table describes the filters applied to our initial sample to attain the sample used in the empirical analysis. The first two 
columns of each row show the number of firms and the number of private equity investments available for our analysis after each 
filter. The last four columns show the median of four different performance statistics (IRR, PME, Modified IRR [or MIRR], and 
Multiple) for the sample resulting after each filter is applied. The last row of the table corresponds to our final sample used in the 
rest of the tables. 
 
 Number of Median 
 Firms Investments IRR PME MIRR Multiple
  
Initial sample 334 11,704  
  
Exclude debt and public equity investments 333 11,494  
  
Exclude investments for which PME cannot be 
computed 329 11,233 0.16 1.15 0.13 1.55
        
Exclude investments for which investment size is 
not reported 328 11,101 0.15 1.13 0.13 1.53
        
Exclude investments with missing industry 
information 320 10,473 0.16 1.15 0.13 1.57
  
Exclude firms with selected track record 
307 10,185 0.16 1.14 0.13 1.55 
  
Exclude firms reporting investments made by the 
managers before they worked at the firm 258 9,121 0.17 1.15 0.14 1.60
        
Exclude investments made less than two years 
before date at which PPM is written 254 7,453 0.21 1.27 0.17 1.90
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Table IV – Private equity investment performance, duration, and other characteristics 
The table shows basic statistics about our sample of private equity investments. Statistics are shown for the full sample of 7,453 observations and for several sub-samples that 
classify investments by: exit route (panel A), duration (panel B), size (panel C), country of investment (panel D), and year of initiation (panel E). The statistics include: the 
median of four different performance measures (IRR, PME, MIRR, and Multiple), the fraction of investments that went bankrupt (returned no equity to investors), the 
fraction of “home runs” (investments with an IRR above 50%), and the fraction of “quick flips” (investments held for less than two years). The last three columns of the table 
provide the median duration, the median investment size, and the median SI (the number of simultaneous investments by the firm over the life of each investment). 
Investments with “duration set to median” are investments whose duration was not known and could not be inferred (see table A.3).  
 
Panel A: Performance by exit status 
 Number of Median Fraction Median   
 investments 
 
IRR PME MIRR Multiple Bankrupt Home-run Quick Flip Duration Investment 
size 
SI 
Full sample 7453 0.21 1.27 0.17 1.90 0.10 0.25 0.12 3.92 15 18 
    
Realized 5106 0.26 1.40 0.23 2.10 0.15 0.30 0.17 3.92 12 17 
. IPO exit 631 0.46 2.18 0.39 3.36 0.00 0.46 0.20 3.62 18 17 
. Sale exit 1350 0.36 1.70 0.31 2.57 0.00 0.36 0.18 3.67 12 16 
. Bankrupt 749 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.08 4.00 14 21 
. Other 81 0.33 1.33 0.25 2.42 0.00 0.31 0.05 4.75 5 12 
. Unknown 2295 0.29 1.53 0.26 2.20 0.00 0.31 0.18 3.58 12 17 
Partially    
Realized 730 0.26 1.66 0.21 2.41 0.03 0.28 0.08 4.17 25 19 
Unrealized 1617 0.05 0.96 0.04 1.18 0.00 0.09 0.00 3.92 19 19 
 
Panel B: Performance by duration of investment 
 Number of Median Fraction Median 
 Investments 
 
IRR PME MIRR Multiple Bankrupt Home run Quick Flip Duration Investment 
size 
SI 
   0 to 2 years 903 0.85 1.94 0.79 2.40 0.07 0.67 1.00 1.33 13 15 
   2 to 3 years 1557 0.38 1.63 0.35 2.12 0.05 0.39 0.00 2.42 18 17 
   3 to 4 years 1289 0.27 1.44 0.25 2.10 0.07 0.26 0.00 3.42 16 17 
   4 to 5 years 993 0.17 1.23 0.15 1.87 0.07 0.14 0.00 4.35 15 18 
   5 to 6 years 734 0.16 1.22 0.14 2.00 0.08 0.11 0.00 5.42 15 18 
   ! 6 years 1347 0.08 0.79 0.06 1.59 0.08 0.06 0.00 7.42 13 18 
Investments 
  with duration 630 -0.45 0.06 -0.45 0.10 0.48 0.03 0.00 4.00 14 24 
  set to median            
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Panel C: Performance by investment size 
 Number of Median Fraction Median 
 Investments 
 
IRR PME MIRR Multiple Bankrupt Home run Quick flip Duration Investment 
size 
SI 
< $5 US million 1632 0.21 1.21 0.18 1.90 0.12 0.29 0.14 4.00 3 16 
$5 to $10 US million  1272 0.20 1.23 0.17 1.90 0.09 0.26 0.12 4.00 7 16 
$10 to $20 US million 1454 0.20 1.26 0.17 1.87 0.10 0.24 0.12 3.83 14 18 
$20 to $30 US million 748 0.23 1.37 0.19 1.90 0.11 0.25 0.13 3.77 25 18 
$30 to $50 US million 864 0.21 1.29 0.17 1.80 0.10 0.22 0.11 3.83 38 18 
$50 to $100 US million 720 0.20 1.26 0.17 1.90 0.09 0.23 0.10 3.83 67 18 
> $100 US million 763 0.20 1.39 0.17 1.91 0.09 0.21 0.11 3.92 174 21 
 
 
Panel D: Performance by investment location 
 Number of Median Fraction Median 
 investments 
 
IRR PME MIRR Multiple Bankrupt Home run Quick flip Duration Investment 
size 
SI 
 U.S. 3163 0.22 1.33 0.18 1.96 0.12 0.27 0.13 4.00 19 16 
 Rest developed  
    Countries 3524 0.22 1.27 0.18 1.90 0.08 0.25 0.12 3.75 13 20 
   . UK 1427 0.21 1.18 0.17 1.83 0.09 0.25 0.14 3.67 14 25 
   . France 478 0.22 1.27 0.18 1.92 0.08 0.21 0.09 3.75 9 20 
   . Scandinavia 428 0.24 1.66 0.21 2.24 0.05 0.31 0.10 3.92 12 18 
   . Germany 259 0.25 1.42 0.22 2.11 0.13 0.28 0.08 4.00 23 28 
   . Italy 259 0.20 1.10 0.18 1.75 0.08 0.25 0.15 3.58 7 13 
   . Netherlands 174 0.20 1.36 0.18 1.89 0.06 0.26 0.14 3.79 16 18 
   . Other 504 0.23 1.32 0.19 1.90 0.07 0.26 0.13 3.71 14 13 
 Developing countries 759 0.13 1.10 0.12 1.54 0.11 0.16 0.09 4.00 9 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Performance by period of investment initiation 
 Number of Median Fraction Median 
 investments 
 
IRR PME MIRR Multiple Bankrupt Home run Quick flip Duration Investment 
size 
SI 
" 1985 226 0.48 2.29 0.40 4.40 0.08 0.48 0.09 4.00 4 9 
1986 87 0.48 2.13 0.36 3.50 0.07 0.48 0.28 4.08 9 10 
1987 75 0.31 1.54 0.28 2.10 0.16 0.33 0.23 4.00 9 12 
1988 121 0.22 1.05 0.16 2.30 0.08 0.26 0.11 4.40 10 11 
1989 135 0.18 1.13 0.15 2.02 0.13 0.21 0.08 4.50 12 9 
1990 174 0.15 0.96 0.13 2.12 0.11 0.18 0.06 5.00 13 13 
1991 198 0.27 1.31 0.22 2.43 0.05 0.28 0.10 4.04 8 15 
1992 280 0.26 1.16 0.21 2.34 0.09 0.25 0.07 4.01 10 16 
1993 280 0.35 1.36 0.28 2.37 0.07 0.36 0.14 4.00 11 15 
1994 453 0.23 0.97 0.19 1.97 0.11 0.26 0.12 4.00 8 19 
1995 480 0.19 0.91 0.17 1.90 0.13 0.23 0.10 4.00 11 22 
1996 584 0.19 1.02 0.16 1.84 0.12 0.26 0.15 4.00 12 18 
1997 665 0.16 1.09 0.13 1.61 0.10 0.24 0.14 4.00 13 20 
1998 647 0.11 1.19 0.09 1.43 0.13 0.19 0.14 4.00 16 19 
1999 736 0.10 1.41 0.09 1.44 0.11 0.14 0.10 4.00 21 19 
2000 740 0.03 1.29 0.03 1.09 0.18 0.09 0.09 4.00 17 19 
2001 398 0.22 1.62 0.19 1.88 0.09 0.21 0.11 3.86 18 19 
2002 361 0.31 1.54 0.27 2.14 0.04 0.32 0.12 3.42 22 21 
2003 389 0.47 1.73 0.39 2.60 0.04 0.45 0.17 2.92 26 20 
2004 289 0.37 1.50 0.32 2.10 0.04 0.40 0.13 2.65 30 21 
2005 135 0.32 1.35 0.27 1.80 0.06 0.34 0.18 2.25 44 24 
    
1973-1995 2509 0.26 1.17 0.21 2.30 0.10 0.29 0.11 4.00 9 15 
1996-2005 4944 0.18 1.33 0.15 1.70 0.11 0.23 0.13 3.67 18 19 
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Table V - Base regression 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. The dependent variables are the investment’s IRR (panel A) 
and the investment’s PME (panel B). All explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by 
PE firm and investment year. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is the investment’s IRR 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Base
Log SI -0.084a   -0.087a
 0.010   0.011
Market return  0.137a   0.137a
  0.019   0.019
Log investment size   -0.058a   -0.054a
  0.012   0.012
Portfolio volatility  0.048a   0.017
  0.011   0.011
Duration rest portfolio  -0.016c  0.003
  0.009  0.010
Log firm age   -0.021b 0.019b
   0.009 0.010
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.098 0.087 0.086 0.082 0.082 0.118
Number of investments 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is the investment’s PME 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Base
Log SI -0.142a   -0.164a
 0.024   0.025
Market return  -0.036   -0.039
  0.034   0.033
Log investment size  -0.184a   -0.184a
  0.030   0.030
Portfolio volatility  0.090a   0.030
  0.026   0.027
Duration rest portfolio  0.038  0.077a
  0.024  0.025
Log firm age   -0.022 0.040
   0.023 0.026
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.061 0.070 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.078
Number of investments 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453 7453
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
 
 50 
 
Table VI – Statistics by PE firm scale decile 
The table breaks the sample of investments down into SI deciles and provides various statistics for each group. The last column shows the difference between the lowest 
and the highest deciles and the statistical significance of the difference. We use a sign test for differences in medians, a t-test for differences in averages, an F-test for 
differences in variance, and a Chi-squared test for differences in proportions. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
SI deciles Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High  Low-High 
Lower bound SI 1.00 5.93 8.44 11.37 14.28 17.64 21.63 27.90 39.56 58.06  
Upper bound SI 5.93 8.44 11.37 14.28 17.64 21.63 27.90 39.56 58.06 136.10  
   
Fraction of quick flips 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11a 
Mean duration 3.42 3.81 3.95 4.27 4.17 4.19 4.22 4.16 3.95 4.16 -0.74a 
   
Median IRR 0.36 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.20a 
Median PME 1.65 1.51 1.31 1.21 1.30 1.41 1.10 1.10 1.17 1.08 0.57a 
Median MIRR 0.32 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.19a 
Median Multiple 2.50 2.10 1.96 1.85 1.96 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.80 1.78 0.72a 
   
% Bankrupt 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.12 -0.06a 
% With losses (IRR<0%) 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.31 -0.18a 
% Home runs (IRR>50%) 0.39 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.20a 
% Underperformance (PME<1) 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.47 -0.21a 
% Strong outperformance  0.41 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.16a 
     (PME>2)   
Variance (IRR) – All 0.46 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.39 0.07b 
Variance (IRR) if IRR<0% 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.00  
Variance (IRR) if IRR>0% 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.10a 
Variance (PME) – All 3.51 2.87 2.82 2.63 2.69 2.82 2.22 2.91 3.04 1.97 1.53a 
Variance (PME)  if PME<1 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.03 
Variance (PME)  if PME>1 3.12 2.57 2.57 2.33 2.42 2.49 2.18 2.72 2.73 1.72 1.40a 
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table VII – Robustness of diseconomies of scale to empirical approach 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. The dependent variables are the investment’s IRR (panel 
A) and the investment’s PME (panel B). The control variables in each regression are those of the base specification in 
table 5 (market return, log investment size, portfolio volatility, duration rest portfolio, log firm age, time fixed effects, 
country fixed effects, and industry fixed effects). All explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are 
clustered by PE firm and investment year. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A:  The dependent variable is the investment’s IRR 
 Log SI Control 
variables 
Adjusted 
R2 
Number of 
investments
Sample selection     
1. Excluding unrealized investments -0.096a yes 0.123 5836
 0.013   
2. Excluding unrealized and partially realized investments -0.100a yes 0.122 5106
 0.015   
3. Excluding all investments with inferred IRR -0.092a yes 0.118 6430
 0.012   
-0.109a yes 0.125 45754. Excluding unrealized, partially realized investments, and all 
investments with inferred IRR 0.015   
-0.076a yes 0.092 9121
0.012   
5. Adding investments made less than two years before date the 
PPM is written 
  
Change of methodology   
6. Winsorize at 99th percentile instead of 95th percentile -0.107a yes 0.090 7453
 0.017   
7. Tobit estimation instead of OLS -0.093a yes 0.123 7453
 0.010   
-0.081a yes 0.113 74538. Substituting Log SI by the residual Log SI obtained from a 
regression of Log SI on investment duration 0.012   
   
Sub-samples of  investments   
 9. Investments with firm scale (SI) below sample median -0.070a yes 0.123 3726
 0.015   
10. Investments with firm scale (SI) above sample median -0.059a yes 0.110 3727
 0.014   
11. Investments made before 1995 (1973-1995) -0.128a yes 0.143 2509
 0.017   
12. Investments made after 1995 (1996-2005) -0.061a yes 0.126 4944
 0.013   
13. US investments -0.108a yes 0.125 3163
 0.016   
14. Rest developed countries -0.064a yes 0.117 3531
 0.014   
15. Developing countries -0.127a yes 0.199 759
 0.030   
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Panel B: The dependent variable is the investment’s PME 
 Log SI Control 
variables 
Adjusted 
R2 
Number of 
investments
Sample selection     
1. Excluding unrealized investments -0.180a yes 0.091 5836
 0.029   
2. Excluding unrealized and partially realized investments -0.181a yes 0.089 5106
 0.033   
3. Excluding all investments with inferred or assumed duration -0.187a yes 0.073 5698
(hence with inferred PME) 0.029   
-0.218a yes 0.086 33524. Excluding unrealized and partially realized investments, and 
excluding all investments with inferred or assumed duration 0.044   
-0.140a yes 0.067 9121
0.025   
5. Adding investments made less than two years before date at 
which PPM is written 
  
Change of methodology   
6. Winsorize at 99th percentile instead of 95th percentile -0.145a yes 0.073 7453
 0.023   
7. Tobit estimation instead of OLS -0.155a yes 0.069 7453
 0.023   
-0.151a yes 0.065 74538. Substituting Log SI by the residual Log SI obtained from a 
regression of Log SI on investment duration 0.027   
   
Sub-samples of  investments   
 9. Investments with firm scale (SI) below sample median -0.219a yes 0.086 3726
 0.038   
10. Investments with firm scale (SI) above sample median -0.093a yes 0.074 3727
 0.031   
11. Investments made before 1995 (1973-1995) -0.273a yes 0.165 2509
 0.045   
12. Investments made after 1995 (1996-2005) -0.095a yes 0.051 4944
 0.030   
13. US investments -0.202a yes 0.092 3163
 0.042   
14. Rest developed countries -0.115a yes 0.059 3531
 0.034   
15. Developing countries -0.244a yes 0.140 759
 0.064   
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table VIII – Survivorship bias 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. The sample of investments used in this table consists of 
our full sample of investments plus the 464 investments made by forty-five private equity firms that did not raise a new 
fund after 2000 (dead firms). The source used to identify dead firms and the information to compute the explanatory 
variables of the investments made by these firms is Thomson. Since the information provided by Thomson does not 
include investment returns, we impute returns according to the exit status of each investment. We assign an IRR of -
100% and a PME of 0 to any investment reported as defunct (32% of all cases) or without an exit (11% of all cases). For 
investments exited via an IPO (12% of all cases), we assign half of the median IRR and PME of the IPO-exited 
investment in our sample (i.e., 21% IRR and 1.09 PME). Finally, for investments exited via a sale (45% of all cases), we 
assign half of the median IRR of the sale-exited investments in our sample (i.e., 18% IRR and 0.85 PME). The dependent 
variables are the investment’s IRR (panel A) and the investment’s PME (panel B). All explanatory variables are 
expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. All variables are defined in table 
A.1. 
 
 Adding the investments made by 
dead firms 
 Adding twice the investments 
made by dead firms 
Dependent variable: IRR PME  IRR PME 
Log SI -0.086a -0.147a -0.083a -0.139a
 0.011 0.025 0.011 0.025
Market return 0.129a -0.045 0.125a -0.030
 0.018 0.031 0.018 0.029
Log investment size -0.018 -0.108a 0.000 -0.071b
 0.013 0.032 0.014 0.033
Portfolio volatility 0.011 0.023 0.010 0.021
 0.011 0.027 0.011 0.026
Duration rest portfolio 0.018c 0.103a 0.024b 0.113a
 0.010 0.025 0.010 0.024
Log firm age 0.000 -0.002 -0.009 -0.021
 0.010 0.025 0.010 0.025
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.052 0.101 0.050
Number of investments 7917 7917 8381 8381
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table IX – Firm and fund fixed effects 
The table shows regression results using firm and fund fixed effects. The sample used in firm fixed effects regressions is our full 
sample. The sample used in fund fixed effects regressions excludes all investments for which we do not know the identity of the 
fund that made them. The dependent variables are the investment’s IRR (panel A) and the investment’s PME (panel B). All 
explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. All variables are 
defined in table A.1. 
 
 Firm fixed effects  Fund fixed effects 
Dependent variable: IRR PME  IRR PME 
Log SI -0.271a -0.631a -0.301a -0.768a
 0.028 0.072 0.033 0.081
Market return 0.135a -0.059c 0.151a -0.049
 0.020 0.035 0.022 0.040
Log investment size -0.087a -0.293a -0.085a -0.291a
 0.014 0.036 0.016 0.040
Portfolio volatility 0.019 0.000 0.003 -0.045
 0.016 0.041 0.018 0.044
Duration rest portfolio 0.023 0.130a 0.031c 0.141a
 0.015 0.038 0.017 0.042
Log firm age 0.055a 0.117a 0.063a 0.142a
 0.014 0.039 0.015 0.041
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes no no
Fund fixed effects no no yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.116 0.156 0.112
Number of investments 7453 7453 6358 6358
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table X – Reverse causality 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares for two-year investment blocks of each PE firm. Each investment block contains all the investments initiated by each 
PE firm during a two-year period. The dependent variables are the mean IRR of block t (panel A) and the mean PME of block t (panel B). The means of these two performance 
measures are calculated as the (size-weighted) average of the performance of all investments in the block, winsorizing investment return and investment size at the 95th percentile. 
All explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
 
 Panel A:  
The dependent variable is the mean IRR of block t 
 Panel B:  
The dependent variable is the mean PME of block t 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5  Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 
Mean log SI of block t -0.109a -0.066a  -0.455a -0.297a 
 0.019 0.013  0.056 0.038 
Mean log SI of block t-1 -0.068a   -0.311a  
 0.016   0.043  
Mean log SI of block t-2 -0.064a   -0.312a  
 0.023   0.045  
Mean log SI of block t minus -0.032a -0.026b  -0.142a -0.116a 
   mean log SI of block t-1 0.012 0.012  0.041 0.038 
Mean log investment size of  -0.027b -0.032c -0.036c -0.046b -0.041c  -0.085b -0.079c -0.091c -0.122b -0.100c 
   block t 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.022  0.034 0.043 0.048 0.061 0.057 
Mean market return of block t 0.688b 0.867b 0.849b 0.068b 0.069b  -0.948 -0.204 0.067 -0.076 -0.068 
 0.301 0.353 0.397 0.033 0.033  0.764 0.844 0.705 0.079 0.076 
Block volatility 0.042 0.013 -0.022 -0.009 0.012  0.396a 0.391a 0.353a 0.291a 0.378a 
 0.043 0.048 0.065 0.015 0.016  0.056 0.065 0.077 0.056 0.053 
Log block sequence number 0.023 0.025 0.011 -0.010 0.001  0.146b 0.216b 0.150 0.006 0.059 
 0.021 0.035 0.059 0.016 0.018  0.059 0.096 0.139 0.045 0.050 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.155 0.162 0.147 0.166  0.184 0.140 0.116 0.114 0.171 
Number of blocks 1170 916 685 916 916  1170 916 685 916 916 
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table XI - Fund level analysis 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. The sample of investments used in the table is the subset of investments 
for which we know the fund that made the investment. We also restrict the sample to those funds that have finished their investment 
period, but since this is not observable, we follow Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and assume that the investment period is five years. The 
dependent variables are the fund’s IRR (panel A) and the fund’s PME (panel B). These two performance measures are calculated as the 
(size-weighted) averages of the performance of the investments made by the fund, winsorizing investment returns and investment size at 
the 95th percentile. All explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. 
All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is Fund IRR 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Spec 7 
 US funds US funds US funds All funds All funds All funds All funds 
Mean Log SI of fund -0.055a   -0.079a   -0.068a 
 0.018   0.015   0.014 
Log fund size  -0.031 0.062  -0.044b -0.163 -0.036 
  0.023 0.171  0.021 0.175 0.024 
Log fund size square   -0.110   0.113  
   0.159   0.163  
Mean market return of fund 0.109a   0.092a   0.092a 
 0.029   0.028   0.026 
Fund volatility 0.006   0.002   0.003 
 0.021   0.012   0.012 
Log fund sequence number -0.001 -0.024 -0.101b 0.027 0.000 -0.044 0.034c 
 0.021 0.025 0.040 0.018 0.020 0.036 0.020 
Log fund sequence number    0.122a   0.053  
  Square   0.043   0.036  
Time year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country focus fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes 
Industry focus fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects no yes no no yes no no 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.128 0.121 0.169 0.122 0.113 0.175 
Number of funds 264 264 264 471 471 471 471 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is Fund PME 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 Spec 5 Spec 6 Spec 7 
 US funds US funds US funds All funds All funds All funds All funds 
Mean Log SI of fund -0.169a -0.230a  -0.205a 
 0.060 0.044  0.043 
Log fund size  -0.084 0.344 -0.118c -0.184 -0.080 
  0.060 0.499 0.065 0.463 0.057 
Log fund size square  -0.481  0.059 
  0.488  0.421 
Mean market return of fund -0.026 -0.034  -0.032 
 0.075 0.076  0.073 
Fund volatility 0.336a 0.324a  0.324a 
 0.040 0.035  0.034 
Log fund sequence number 0.035 -0.125 -0.294b 0.088b -0.040 -0.143 0.102b 
 0.061 0.079 0.142 0.044 0.055 0.099 0.045 
Log fund sequence number   0.311b  0.150c 
  Square  0.128  0.085 
Vintage year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country focus fixed effects no no no yes yes yes yes 
Industry focus fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects no yes no no yes no no 
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.139 0.100 0.234 0.095 0.074 0.239 
Number of funds 264 264 264 471 471 471 471 
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table XII – Alternative scale measures 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. The dependent variables are the investment’s IRR (panel A) and the 
investment’s PME (panel B). The control variables in each regression are those of the base specification in table 5 (market return, log 
investment size, portfolio volatility, duration rest portfolio, log firm age, time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and industry fixed 
effects). Each line shows a summary of the results obtained after running two different regressions. The first regression includes the 
above-mentioned control variables and the alternative measure, while the second regression includes, in addition, Log SI. All 
explanatory variables shown are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. All variables are 
defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is investment’s IRR 
  
Log SI is not included 
 
Log SI is included 
Number of 
investments
 
Alternative measures 
Alternative 
measure 
Adjusted  
R2 
Alternative 
measure 
Log SI Adjusted  
R2 
 
Log EUM -0.077a 0.112 -0.006 -0.084a 0.117 7453
 0.014 0.021 0.017 
Log number of industries held -0.075a 0.114 0.008 -0.095a 0.117 7453
  0.011 0.023 0.022 
One minus Herfindhal industries -0.051a 0.11 -0.014 -0.081a 0.118 7453
  0.011  0.012 0.012  
Log SI per professional -0.018 0.142 0.004 -0.064a 0.142 3068
  0.015 0.014 0.018 
Log number contemporary entry    -0.056a 0.112 0.030c -0.114a 0.118 7453
  0.01 0.016 0.018  
Log number contemporary exit    -0.054a 0.115 0.029 -0.120a 0.122 5106
  0.014 0.02 0.021 
Log investment sequence number  -0.023b 0.107 0.021b -0.099a 0.118 7453
 0.01 0.011 0.012 
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is investment’s PME 
  
Log SI is not included 
 
Log SI is included 
Number of 
investments
 
Alternative measures 
Alternative 
measure 
Adj. R2 Alternative 
measure 
Log SI Adj. R2  
Log EUM -0.124a 0.074 0.033 -0.184a 0.078 7453
 0.037 0.054 0.039 
Log number of industries held -0.119a 0.075 0.104c -0.253a 0.079 7453
  0.026 0.054 0.053 
One minus Herfindhal industries -0.071a 0.073 0.006 -0.167a 0.078 7453
  0.027  0.03 0.029  
Log SI per professional -0.010 0.070 0.007 -0.142a 0.074 3068
  0.035 0.036 0.046 
Log number contemporary entry    -0.123a 0.076 0.001 -0.165a 0.078 7453
  0.024 0.043 0.047  
Log number contemporary exit    -0.103a 0.085 0.042 -0.208a 0.089 5106
  0.03 0.045 0.047 
Log investment sequence number  -0.051b 0.073 0.029 -0.181a 0.078 7453
 0.02 0.024 0.031 
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%.
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Table XIII-A – Organization structure and diseconomies of scale 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. Regressions are run on two different sub-samples in each panel. In panel A, the two sub-samples are: (i) the 
investments made by independent PE firms; and (ii) the investments made by firms that are part of a financial group (non-independent firms). In panel B the two sub-samples are: (i) 
the investments made by PE firms with a hierarchy score below the median; and (ii) the investments made by PE firms with a hierarchy score above the median. In Panel C the two 
sub-samples are: (i) the investments made by PE firms whose employees’ background diversity is less than the median; and (ii) the investments made by PE firms whose employees’ 
background diversity is greater than the median. The dependent variables in each panel are the investment’s IRR and the investment’s PME. The control variables in each regression 
are those of the base specification in table 5 (market return, log investment size, portfolio volatility, duration rest portfolio, log firm age, time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and 
industry fixed effects). All explanatory variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. The table also presents a t-test of the 
difference in coefficients of Log SI in each of the two subgroups. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: Independent versus non-independent firms 
  Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR  Investment’s PME 
 Independent not independent  difference  independent not independent  difference 
  
Log SI -0.075a -0.123a 0.049a -0.132a -0.260a 0.128a 
 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.031 0.051 0.039 
Control variables of base specification yes yes yes yes  
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.123 0.081 0.088  
Number of investments 4900 2322 4900 2322  
 
Panel B: Hierarchy  
  Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR  Investment’s PME 
 below median above median  difference  below median above median difference 
   
Log SI -0.043 -0.107a  0.064b -0.031 -0.155b 0.124c 
 0.028 0.028  0.029 0.071 0.073 0.072 
Control variables of base specification yes yes  yes yes  
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.169  0.076 0.085  
Number of investments 1547 1353  1547 1353  
 
Panel C: Diversity of employees’ background 
  Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR Investment’s PME 
 below median above median  difference below median above median difference 
    
Log SI -0.063a -0.106a  0.043c -0.101 -0.220a 0.120c 
 0.024 0.026  0.025 0.068 0.061 0.064 
Control variables of base specification yes yes  yes yes  
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.146  0.041 0.085  
Number of investments 1647 1508  1647 1508  
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table XIII-B – Organization structure (net of firm scale) and diseconomies of scale 
The table shows regression results using ordinary least squares. Panel A runs regressions of the three organization structure proxies of 
independent PE firm, hierarchy and professionals’ background diversity on the log of SI and a constant.  The residuals of each of these 
regressions are used in the three subsequent panels B, C and D. As in the previous table, the regressions in the last three panels are run 
on two different sub-samples in each panel. In panel B, the two sub-samples are: (i) the investments made by independent PE firms; 
and (ii) the investments made by firms that are part of a financial group (non-independent firms). In panel C the two sub-samples are: 
(i) the investments made by PE firms with a hierarchy score below the median; and (ii) the investments made by PE firms with a 
hierarchy score above the median. In Panel D the two sub-samples are: (i) the investments made by PE firms whose employees’ 
background diversity is less than the median; and (ii) the investments made by PE firms whose employees’ background diversity is 
greater than the median. The dependent variables in each of the last three panels are the investment’s IRR and the investment’s PME. 
The control variables in each regression are those of the base specification in table 5 (market return, log investment size, portfolio 
volatility, duration rest portfolio, log firm age, time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and industry fixed effects). All explanatory 
variables are expressed as a z-score. Standard errors are clustered by PE firm and investment year. The last three panels also present a 
t-test of the difference in coefficients of Log SI in each of the two subgroups. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: Regression of organization structure measures on the log of SI 
Dependent variable is… Independent PE firm 
(1) 
Hierarchy 
(2) 
Professionals’ background 
diversity (3) 
Constant 0.684a -11.412 a 0.424a 
 0.019 0.550 0.038 
Log SI -0.002 5.900a 0.043a 
 0.061 0.174 0.012 
    
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.284 0.004 
Number of investments 7222 2900 3155 
 
Panel B: Independent versus non-independent firms (using the residual from specification (1) of panel A) 
Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR  Investment’s PME 
 independent not independent  difference  independent not independent  difference
Residual log SI -0.061a -0.121a 0.060a -0.082b -0.254a 0.172a
 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.034 0.039 0.036
Control variables  
of base specification yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.131 0.076 0.099
Number of investments 3611 3611 3611 3611
 
Panel C: Hierarchy (using the residual from specification (2) of panel A) 
Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR Investment’s PME 
 below median above median difference below median above median difference 
Residual log SI -0.016 -0.083a 0.067a 0.020 -0.119b 0.140b
 0.027 0.021 0.024 0.059 0.052 0.056
Control variables  
of base specification yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.170 0.102 0.072
Number of investments 1450 1450 1450 1450
 
Panel D: Professionals’ background diversity (using the residual from specification (3) of panel A) 
Dependent variable is… Investment’s IRR Investment’s PME 
 below median above median difference below median above median difference 
Residual log SI -0.051b -0.113a 0.062a -0.109c -0.217a 0.108c
 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.057 0.053 0.055
Control variables  
of base specification yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.155 0.032 0.094
Number of investments 1578 1577 1578 1577
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Table A.1 – Variable descriptions 
This table describes the variables used in the paper. The unit of observation is an investment made by a private equity firm (PE firm). 
Unless specified otherwise, the source of the variables is the private placement memorandum (PPM). 
 
Variable name Variable description 
 
PE firm A private equity firm (PE firm) is an organization that undertakes buyout investments. Since the focus of the paper 
is on the PE industry, we exclude from the sample firms specifically raising money for venture capital or other 
alternative investments such as timber, infrastructure, land, real estate, or mezzanine. These asset classes are 
sometimes also referred to as private equity. 
 
PE fund A private equity fund (PE fund) is a buyout investment fund that is managed by a PE firm. A PE firm may have 
several funds running at the same time. The typical PE firm launches a new fund every two to four years. Funds 
have a finite life lasting ten to fourteen years. 
 
Investment An investment is a private equity transaction realized by a PE firm. PE firms report their investments per company. 
So we follow this practice considering one company as a single investment including all “add-on” acquisitions and 
divestments made by the company as part of the same investments. We exclude debt and public equity investments. 
 
Block of  
 investments t 
We define the block of investments of a PE firm at time t as the group of all the investments initiated by the PE 
firm in the two-year block starting at time t. As an illustration of the procedure we follow, consider a firm that 
made investments between 1994 and 1998. We would split its investments into three different blocks: block 1 
would have investments made in 1994-95; block 2 investments made in 1996-97; and block three investments 
made in 1998. 
Multiple The multiple of the investment is the ratio of total cash received from the investment plus its current valuation (if 
not fully liquidated) to the total cash invested. The measure is gross of fees. Different PPM use different currencies 
to report performance: 57% of PPM use US dollars, 29% use euros, 9% use GBP, and 5% use other currencies such 
as yen and Canadian dollars. 
 
Duration  
 
The length in years between the investment initiation date and the investment exit date. The source of the year of 
investment initiation is the PPM in 100% of the cases. For the 730 partially realized and the 1,617 unrealized 
investments in the sample, the exit date is set as the date of the writing of the PPM. For 3351 realized investments, 
the exit date is the termination date reported in the PPM (81% of the cases) or in the website of the PE firm (19% 
of the cases). For the other 1,755 realized investments, we could not find the exit date in either source. So, for 
1,125 of them, we infer the exit date using the date of the investment initiation, the investment’s multiple, and its 
IRR according to the formula specified in table A.3. For the remaining 630 investments for which the lack of 
information prevented us from applying this formula, we assume the exit date to be four years after the investment 
initiation date because four years is the median holding period of our sample. There are 379 investments for which 
our sources do not provide the month of initiation and 260 for which they do not provide the month of exit. For 
these cases, we assume the month to be June of the reported year unless the resulting duration is less than one year. 
In such cases, we assume the month to be January for investment initiation and December for investment exit.  
 
IRR The internal rate of return, gross of fees, of the investment. Different PPM use different currencies to report 
performance: 57% of PPM use US dollars, 29% use euros, 9% use GBP, and 5% use other currencies such as yen 
and Canadian dollars. For the 1,024 investments with missing IRR in the PPM, we infer it using the multiple and 
the duration provided in the PPM according to the formula specified in table A.3. We Winsorize IRR at the 95th 
percentile (178%). Figures for IRR are often Winsorized at 1000%, and sometimes at 500% in the PPM.  
 
PME The public market equivalent (PME) is the ratio of the present value of dividends to the present value of the 
amount invested. To calculate this measure, we assume that the full amount of the investment is made at the 
investment initiation date, and that all distributions take place at the exit date. To discount the cash flows, we use 
CRSP value-weighted return series. The measure is gross of fees and is computed in the currency originally used in 
the PPM to report performance. 
 
MIRR To calculate the Modified IRR, we follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and compute the measure as the multiple of the 
investment raised to the power of one over the duration of the investment minus one. This calculation implicitly 
assumes that intermediary dividends are reinvested at a zero rate of return and that intermediate investments are 
also financed at a zero rate of return.  
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Table A.1 (cont’) 
 
Variable name Variable description 
 
Log SI The natural logarithm of the average of the number of simultaneous investments by the PE firm during each 
month of the duration (life) of the investment. Where the same PE firm invests in the same company at the 
same time via different funds, we count the investment only once. 
 
Log investment size The natural logarithm of the total amount of equity paid by the PE firm for the investment. Total equity is also 
called investment size and is used to weight investment performance within a fund or a block. For 57% of the 
investments in our sample, investment size is reported in US dollars. In all other cases, we convert investment 
size to US dollars using the exchange rate provided in Datastream for the investment initiation date. The 
investment size is expressed in millions of 2006 US dollars using the consumer price index. 
 
Bankrupt We classify investments as “bankrupt” if they are reported as such in the PPM or if they are reported to return 
no capital. 
 
Home run We classify investments as “home runs” if their IRR is above 50%. 
 
Quick flip We classify investments as “quick flips” if the duration of the investment is (strictly) less than two years. 
 
Exit status The type of exit route for a realized or a partially realized investment. We group investments in five different 
exit routes: (1) investments exited via an IPO; (2) investments exited via a sale, which are those sold to a 
corporation or a financial institution; (3) bankrupt investments; and (4) other exits, which include 
recapitalizations, and all of those cases that the PPM reports as “other” or “complex”. When a company is 
partially exited via an IPO, we classify the exit status as IPO irrespective of the method of the exit for the 
remaining shares. The information sources for the type of exit route are the PPM (57%), the Thomson database 
(34%), and the websites of PE firms (9%). 
 
 Developing  
    and developed  
    countries 
We classify as developing those countries located in Africa, the Middle East, Asia (excluding Japan), Eastern 
Europe, and Latin America. We classify as developed countries the US, the UK, Canada, Western European 
countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The sources of information about the investments’ country of 
location are the PPM (34%), the Thomson database (33%), the websites of PE firms (30%), and the Capital IQ 
database (3%). 
 
Market return The average of the monthly returns of the CRSP value-weighted index between the investment initiation and the 
investment exit dates. We annualize the rate by compounding the monthly average. 
 
Portfolio  
    volatility 
The average of the monthly volatility of the portfolio of investments of the PE firm over the life (duration) of the 
focal investment. To compute this measure, we calculate for each month of the life of the focal investment the 
square root of [w1,t … w48,t].#.[ w1,t … w48,t]’ and then average across all months. We define wi,t as the (size-
weighted) fraction of money invested by the PE firm in industry i, and # as the variance covariance matrix of 
the forty-eight Fama-French industry returns between 1973 and 2007 obtained from Ken French’s website.  
 
Duration  
   rest of portfolio 
The average duration of the rest of the investments in the portfolio of the PE firm over the life of the focal 
investment. To obtain this measure, we compute the duration of each investment in the portfolio of the PE firm 
(excluding the focal investment) and then calculate the (equally-weighted) average for each month over the life 
of the focal investment. We exclude all months during which there are no investments in the PE firm other than 
the focal investment. 
 
Log firm age The natural logarithm of one plus the number of years between the date of the first investment made by the PE 
firm and the investment initiation date of the focal investment. 
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Table A.1 (cont’) 
 
Variable name Variable description 
 
Time fixed effects 
 
Fixed effects based on the year of investment initiation. 
 
Country fixed effects Fixed effects based on the country of investment location. The information sources for the country of 
the investment are the PPM (34%), the websites of PE firms (30%), the Thomson database (33%), and 
the Capital IQ database (3%). 
 
Industry fixed effects Fixed effects based on the industry of the investment. The industries are manually assigned to one of 
the forty-eight Fama-French industry classification using their SIC codes or their would-be SIC codes 
(based on the information in siccode.com). We classify as “machinery” the industry of 112 investments 
for which the PPM reported “manufacturing” as the sector and we could not find further details in other 
databases. The information sources for the industry of the investments are the PPM (60%), the websites 
of PE firms (16%), the Thomson database (20%) and the Capital IQ database (4%). 
 
Fund or firm fixed effects Fixed effects based on the fund or firm that made the investment according to the PPM. There are 1,095 
investments for which we know the PE firm but not the PE fund that made them. These investments are 
excluded when running fund fixed effects or fund level regressions.  
 
Mean log SI of block t-h The equally-weighted average of the Log SI of all the investments that belong to a PE firm’s block of 
investments, where t-h refers to the sequence of this block of investments in the track record of the PE 
firm.  
 
Mean log investment size  
    of block t 
The equally-weighted average of the variable called “Log investment size” across all investments in 
block of investments t. 
 
Mean market return  
    of block t 
The equally-weighted average of the variable called “market return” across all investments in a block of 
investments. 
 
Block volatility The standard deviation of the IRR or the PME of all the investments that belong to the block of 
investments t. 
 
Block sequence number The sequence number of block of investments t in the PE firm’s track record. 
 
Block country/industry The most frequent country or industry of the investments in block of investments t. Where two 
countries or industries are equally frequent, we keep the country or the industry with the larger 
investments in terms of size. This variable is used to define the country and industry fixed effects in 
block-level regressions.   
 
Mean log SI of fund The equally-weighted average of the variable called “Log SI” across all investments that belong to a PE 
fund. 
 
Log fund size The natural logarithm of the capital committed to the PE fund in million of US dollars. The information 
sources for the variable are the PPM (72%), the websites of PE firms (12%), and the Thomson database 
(16%). 
 
Mean market return of fund The equally-weighted average of the variable called “market return” across the investments that belong 
to the fund of the focal investment. 
 
Fund volatility The standard deviation of the IRR or the PME of all investments that belong to the fund of the focal 
investment. 
 
Fund sequence number The sequence number of the PE fund in the PE firm’s track record. If several funds of the same PE firm 
have the same starting year, we assume that smaller funds started earlier. 
 
Fund country/industry The most frequent country or industry of the investments in a PE fund. Where two countries or 
industries are equally frequent, we keep the country or the industry with the larger investments in terms 
of size. This variable is used to define the country and industry fixed-effects in fund-level regressions.   
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 Table A.1 (cont’) 
 
Variable name 
 
Variable description 
Log EUM The natural logarithm of the average of the total equity invested by the firm during each month of the 
life of the focal investment. The total equity invested in a given month is the sum of all the “investment 
size” for all the investments simultaneously held by the firm that month. 
 
Number of industries held The average of the number of different industries in which the PE firm has investments in each month of 
the life of the focal investment. The industry groups we use are the forty-eight Fama-French industries. 
 
One minus Herfindhal  
     industries 
One minus the average of the monthly Herfindhal index of industry concentration during each month of 
the life of the focal investment. We calculate the monthly Herfindhal index of industry concentration 
based on the number of investments the PE firm has in each industry. We use one minus the Herfindhal 
index to have a measure of dispersion rather than concentration. 
 
Number contemporary   
   entry    
The number of investments made by the PE firm from three months before to three months after the 
investment initiation date of the focal investment. 
 
Number contemporary   
   exit    
The number of investments exited by the PE firms from three months before to three months after the 
exit date of the focal investment. This variable is available only for the subset of realised investments. 
 
Investment  
   sequence number 
The sequence number of the investment in the fund’s track record. The sequence is based on the year 
and month of investment initiation date. When several investments start at the same date, we sort 
investments by size and assume smaller investments come first. This variable is available only for the 
investments for which we know the fund identity (see “fund fixed effects” above). 
 
Log SI per professional The natural logarithm of the ratio of the number of simultaneous investments (SI) to the number of 
professionals working at the PE firm in the year of initiation of the investment. If the number of 
professionals is missing for one year but is known for the year t-1 and t+1, we assign to the missing year 
t the average of the years t-1 and t+1. Individuals with job titles containing the words “analysts” and 
“assistants” are not included in the count of professionals. The sources for the data are the Galante 
Private Equity Directories from 1996 (hence covering year 1995) to 2006. 
 
Independent PE firm A PE firm is classified as either independent or not independent (belonging to a financial group) based 
on the information contained in the field called “type of organization” in the Galante Private Equity 
Directory. A firm is classified as independent if none of the following terms is contained in the type of 
organization field: (i) private equity subsidiary; (ii) investment advisory firm; (iii) merchant banking; 
(iv) investment banking firm; (v) merger & acquisition firm. Other items that are found in the field are: 
(i) private venture capital investment firm; (ii) public venture capital investment firm; (iii) private buyout 
investment firm; (iv) public buyout investment firm; (v) private investment firm; (vi) public investment 
firm. There were seventy-six firms which were not found in the Galante Private Equity Directory. We 
classified these firms based on the information contained in the section called “about us” or “history” of 
their website. Of these seventy-six firms there were sixteen for which we could not find reliable 
information either because they did not have a website (twelve cases), or because their website did not 
provide the required information (four cases). We classified those sixteen cases as missing. There were 
only five cases in which we found that the PE firm changed its type of organization during our sample 
period. We have classified the investments made by those firms at different times according to the 
classification of the firm at the time of investment initiation. 
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Table A.1 (cont’) 
 
Variable name 
 
Variable description 
Hierarchy The number of different job titles among the professionals working in the PE firm during the year of the 
initiation of the investment. We count all the titles provided in the Galante Private Equity Directories 
except those that contain the words “analyst” or “assistant.” Because we are interested in constructing a 
proxy for the number of layers in a firm, in the cases of firms with multiple offices we count the job titles 
separately for each office and aggregate them for the firm. In some cases, the information of the title of a 
specific professional was missing. We discarded all the firm-years in which more than-one third of the 
listed professionals had no job title associated with their name. The sources of the variable are the 
Galante Private Equity Directories from 1996 to 2006. 
 
Professionals’  
     background diversity 
One minus the Herfindhal index of the professional backgrounds of the employees working at the PE 
firm the year of the initiation of the investment. To construct this variable, we obtained the list of 
professionals working at each PE firm from the Galante Private Equity directories and collected the 
biographies of each professional. The sources of the biographies are the PPM (65% of cases) and the 
websites of the PE firms (35% of cases). Professionals at the PE firm are classified as having one of 
three different backgrounds: (1) finance background, if they spent most of their pre-PE career working in 
a financial institution; (2) consulting background, if they spent most of their pre-PE career working in a 
consulting or accounting firm; and (3) other background, if they spent most of their pre-PE career 
working in other industries or if they have always worked in PE. Individuals with job titles containing 
the words “analyst” or “assistant” are not included in the count of professionals. The Herfindhal index is 
based on the proportions of the three different backgrounds the year of the investment’s initiation in the 
PE firm. 
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Table A.2 - Example of a PPM 
Appendix D. Fund IV Track record 
Status as at June 30, 2007, In million of Euro 
Company Date of 
investment 
Date 
realized 
Sector Country Cost Realized 
value 
Unrealized 
Value 
Total 
value 
Multiple IRR Exit 
Realized investments    
X1 Apr-00 Apr-06  Healthcare France 60 _  _  0 0.0 n.m.  
X2 May-01 May-06  Industrial  UK 140 120 _  120 0.9 n.m. Trade sale 
X3 Mar-01 Jun-03  Consumer Germany 115 950 _  850 7.4 100% IPO 
X4 Mar-01 Jul-06  Chemicals  Germany 60 85 _  85 1.4 25% Trade sale 
Total Realized  375 1155 1055 2.8 51% _  
Partly realized investments      
X5 Oct-00 _   Healthcare France 500 130 300 430 0.9 n.m.  
X6 Apr-04 _   Industrial  UK 200 150 190 340 1.7 100%  
X7 Feb-03 _   Healthcare France 179 444 43 487 2.7 51%  
Total Partly Realized  879 724 533 1257 1.4 31%  
Unrealized investments      
X8 Dec-05 _   Healthcare France 140 _  280 280 2.0 25%  
X9 Jul-02 _   Industrial  UK 450 _  450 450 1.0 n.m.  
Total Unrealized  590 _  730 730 1.2 10%   
Total      1844 1879 1283 3042 1.6 40%  
 
Table A.3 - Statistics on missing information 
This table shows some descriptive statistics about different groups of investments classified according to the availability of the information in the PPM to compute the 
duration and the IRR of the investment. For the cases when a piece of information to calculate duration was missing, we inferred duration using the investment’s IRR and 
the Multiple according to the following formula: Multiple = (1+IRR)duration.  We used the same formula to infer IRR when duration and the Multiple were provided in the 
PPM. Table A1 provides detailed definitions of all the variables. 
 
 Number of Median Median   
 investments IRR PME MIRR Multiple Duration Investment size SI 
Duration         
  . Available in PPM 5698 0.20 1.26 0.16 1.89 3.83 15 17 
  . Assumed         
    .. Inferred from IRR 1125 0.37 1.88 0.37 2.70 3.02 13 17 
    .. Set to median (IRR is -1 or 0) 325 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 4.00 13 23 
  .. Set to median (no IRR was available) 305 -0.14 0.38 -0.14 0.55 4.00 14 26 
IRR         
   . Available in PPM 6430 0.26 1.42 0.21 2.08 3.67 15 17 
   . Inferred from duration         
    .. Inferred with available duration 719 -0.10 0.37 -0.10 0.60 5.00 16 25 
    .. Inferred with assumed duration 305 -0.14 0.38 -0.14 0.54 4.00 14 27 
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Table A.4 - Correlation matrix and distribution 
Panels A and B of this table show the correlation matrix for the (z-score of the) main variables used in regressions. Panel C shows the 
distribution of these variables. All variables are defined in table A.1. 
 
Panel A: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 IRR 1.00        
2 MIRR 0.97a 1.00       
3 PME 0.76a 0.77a 1.00      
4 Log SI -0.13a -0.13a -0.12a 1.00     
5 Market return 0.20a 0.20a -0.05a 0.00 1.00    
6 Log investment size -0.07a -0.05a -0.08a 0.07a -0.12a 1.00   
7 Portfolio volatility 0.07a 0.05a 0.06a -0.25a 0.02c -0.15a 1.00  
8 Duration rest of portfolio -0.04a -0.05a 0.01 0.17a 0.02 -0.06a -0.05a 1.00 
9 Log firm age -0.03b -0.02b -0.01 0.39a -0.07a 0.23a -0.15a 0.20a 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
  4 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
4 Log SI 1.00           
10 Duration investment 0.07a 1.00          
11 Log EUM 0.67a 0.08a 1.00         
12 Log number of industries held 0.90a 0.08a 0.60a 1.00        
13 One minus Herfindhal industries 0.58a 0.06a 0.38a 0.84a 1.00       
14 Log number contemporary entry    0.83a -0.01 0.52a 0.74a 0.46a 1.00      
15 Log investment sequence number    0.56a -0.04a 0.27a 0.49a 0.26a 0.49a 1.00     
16 Log number contemporary exit 0.80a 0.12a 0.55a 0.72a 0.45a 0.68a 0.47a 1.00    
17 Log SI per professional 0.40a 0.04c 0.10a 0.26a 0.09a 0.35a 0.22a 0.23a 1.00   
18 Independent PE firm 0.00 0.02 -0.08a 0.02c 0.02c 0.01 -0.02c 0.02c -0.11a 1.00  
19 Hierarchy 0.54a -0.08a 0.32a 0.48a 0.24a 0.40a 0.56a 0.37a -0.27a 0.20a 1.00 
20 Professionals’ background diversity 0.14a -0.09a 0.07a 0.17a 0.12a 0.14a 0.11a 0.16a -0.24a -0.04 0.41a 
 
Panel C: Distribution 
   Mean 
 
Stdev 
  
Min 25th  
percentile 
50th  
percentile 
75th  
percentile 
Max 
 
1 IRR 0.24 0.66  -1.00 0.00 0.21 0.50 1.90 
2 MIRR 0.19 0.58  -1.00 -0.01 0.17 0.43 1.55 
3 PME 1.75 1.67  0.00 0.55 1.27 2.39 6.19 
4 Log SI 2.89 0.87  0.00 2.28 2.87 3.50 4.91 
5 Market return 0.12 0.10  -0.35 0.05 0.13 0.19 1.15 
6 Log investment size 2.65 1.50  -8.77 1.74 2.70 3.66 5.31 
7 Portfolio volatility 26.56 4.37  15.59 23.92 26.19 28.38 60.94 
8 Duration rest of portfolio 4.65 1.02  0.00 3.98 4.73 5.35 8.11 
9 Log firm age 1.41 1.30  -2.48 0.88 1.76 2.31 3.34 
10 Duration investment 4.04 1.96  0.25 2.57 3.92 5.25 8.11 
11 Log EUM 6.06 1.53  -2.02 4.97 6.08 7.23 9.25 
12 Log number of industries held 2.28 0.67  0.00 1.84 2.33 2.79 3.58 
13 One minus Herfindhal industries 0.81 0.14  0.00 0.78 0.86 0.90 0.95 
14 Log number contemporary entry    1.79 0.88  0.00 1.10 1.79 2.40 3.85 
15 Log investment sequence number 16.59 28.52  1.00 4.00 8.00 16.00 205.00 
16 Log number contemporary exit 1.59 0.92  0.00 1.10 1.61 2.20 3.66 
17 Log SI per professional 0.92 0.57  0.25 0.50 0.66 1.20 3.50 
18 Independent PE firm 0.68 0.47  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
19 Hierarchy 6.74 7.90  1.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 42.00 
20 Professionals’ background diversity 0.49 0.12  0.13 0.44 0.50 0.59 0.67 
a significant at 1%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 10%. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of performance, duration, and size 
This figure shows histograms of IRR, public market equivalent (PME), investment duration (in years), and investment size (equity 
invested in millions of 2006 US dollars). The first bar of each histogram includes all observations below the threshold. The last bar of 
each histogram includes all observations in the threshold and above. 
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Figure 2: Performance and firm scale 
The figure shows histograms for the median IRR and median PME for each firm scale decile based on SI. 
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